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Abstract
           Since the Renaissance, the normative approach to a philosophy of music has concerned itself
primarily with the subjective experience of the listener.  This was not always the case.  From Greek
Antiquity to the Renaissance, music was considered a rigorous, mathematical discipline that shed
light on objective truths concerning cosmology and cosmogony.  Musica theorica, therefore, took
precedence over musica practica and was taken much more seriously in musical scholarship. 
Although tension had always existed between musica theorica and musica practica, such tension
reached its peak during the Renaissance and as a result, a shift occurred:  musica theorica was
pushed into the background, and musica practica stepped forward.
The intention of this thesis is to convince its reader of the need to bring musica theorica back
to its proper place in musical and philosophical scholarship, where objective answers can be found,
and music’s innate eternal nature is revealed.  The thesis begins with a historical survey of musical
scholarship that eventually brings the reader to the center of the controversy that ensued during the
Renaissance, and then forward to present day discussions in philosophy of music that are concerned
with music’s subjective and temporal properties. It is hoped that the reader will see the need for a
new shift to occur in philosophy of music that focuses on music’s objective and eternal properties
(that are wholly distinct from the subject experiencing it), and will come away with a new
perspective regarding the interdisciplinary nature of philosophy and music.
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Press Conference, New Delhi, Monday May 17, 1999, announcing the “World Festival of Sacred Music.”*
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“Among the many forms in which the human spirit has tried to express its innermost
yearnings and perceptions, music is perhaps the most universal.
It symbolizes the yearnings for harmony with oneself and with others, with nature, and
with the spiritual and sacred within us and around us.”*
Dalai Lama         
 This dichotomy is part of a tripartite in musical scholarship which includes musica poetica as well.  The term1
musica poetica was used in music-theoretical writings; see, for example, Joachim Burmeister, Musicapoetica (Tostock:
Stephan Myliander, 1606).  For a Latin edition and English translation of this treatise, see Benito V. Rivera, translated
with introduction and notes, Joachim Burmeister: Musical Poetics, part of Music Theory Translation Series, ed. by
Claude V. Palisca (New Haven, Connecticut and London: Yale University Press, 1993).  For a summary of this
terminology, see Martin Ruhuke, “Musica theorica, practica and poetica,” in Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart,
14 vols., ed. by Friedrich Blume (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1949-1973), Vol. 9 (1961), cols. 949-958.
 Note the contributions of such contemporary scholars as Peter Kivy, Harold Fiske, Jean-Jacques Nattiez, and2
Francis Sparshott which are discussed later in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
 See Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” in: The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 29 vols.,ed.3
by Stanley Sadie, John Tyrrell, (London: Macmillan, 2001), Vol. 25, pp. 361-363; Boethius, Fundamentals of Music,
trans. by Calvin Bower and ed. by Claude V. Palisca as part of Music Theory Translation Series, ed. by Claude V. Palisca
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Chapter 1
An Introduction: 
Musica theorica, Musica practica, and Philosophy
Any inquiry involving music seems to necessitate an immediate distinction between musica
theorica (music theory) and musica practica (musical performance) .  One possible way of1
characterizing this distinction is to look upon musica theorica as encompassing the why of music,
and musica practica as encompassing the how. Philosophy, in general, is also concerned with the
why of things, yet, any inquiry involving the ‘philosophy of music’ stays, for the most part, within
the boundaries of musica practica addressing such questions as : “what kind of emotive response
did the musical experience illicit?”, or “what kind of meaning was the composer trying to get across
to the listener?”, or even, “what is it that made that musical experience so beautiful?”  When
pondering the notion of a ‘philosophy of music’, one is, for the most part, confined within the sphere
of aesthetics.   There are no objective truths being sought, and it is the general opinion that there are
none to be found.   This, however, was not always the case.2
Before the Renaissance, music was looked upon as a rigorous discipline, and took its place
alongside arithmetic, geometry and astronomy as one of the four branches of the quadrivium  (the3
(New Haven, Connecticut and London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. xix; see also Chapter 3 of this thesis.
The quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and harmonics) along with the trivium (grammar, rhetoric4
and logic) comprised the seven branches of the artes liberales.  For a more comprehensive discussion on this subject, and
an explication regarding the significance of artes liberales in the university education system of the Middle Ages, see
Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Die artes im Lehrplan der Universitäten,” in: Artes im Mittelalter, ed. by Ursula Schaefer (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1999), pp. 13-33; Guy Beajouan, “L’enseignement du quadrivium,” in: Settimane di studio del Centro
italiano di studi sull’alto Medievo 19 (1972), pp. 639-667; Friedmar Kühnert, Allgemeinbildung und Fachbildung in der
Antike, Vol. 30 of Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin: Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961).
See Claude V. Palisca, Florentine Camerata: Documentary Studies and Translations, as part of the Music5
Theory Translation Series ed. by Claude V. Palisca (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1989). 
 See Boethius’s Fundamentals of Music, trans. by  Calvin Bower; Claude V. Palisca, “Boethius in the6
Renaissance” in Music Theory and Its Sources: Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Vol. 1 of Notre Dame Conferences in
Medieval Studies, ed. by André Barbera (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp.259-280.
 The contributions of Vincenzo Galilei (late sixteenth century) and René Descartes (early seventeenth century)7
are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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cornerstone of Platonic scientific education revived by Boethius in the Middle Ages) .  Because of4
its sublime harmonic perfection and its intrinsic mathematical nature, the principles governing
music were thought to be the same as those governing our universe; it was hoped, therefore, that
music would shed light on many physical and philosophical problems pertaining to cosmology and
cosmogony.  From the Pythagoreans of the sixth century B.C.E. to the Florentine Camerata in
sixteenth-century Italy, music was often found at the center of ongoing philosophical debates.5
Although the tension between advocates of musica theorica and those of musica practica can be
found in  scholarly works as early as the fourth century B.C.E., it reached its peak in the Renaissance
when musica theorica came under much scrutiny as the pinnacle of musical study.  Boethius’ De
institutione musica, the most authoritative source in the training of musicians (and philosophers)
throughout the Middle Ages and well into the Renaissance , was eventually disregarded as an6
obsolete text of little use to the practicing musician.  Musical scholars  began questioning whether7
the numerical ratios expounded upon in musical treatises up to this point were worth investigating.
 See Mark Lindley, “Temperaments” in: The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 29 vols. ed. by8
Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell, (London: Macmillan, 2001), Vol. 25, pp. 248-268.
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The discrepancy between the musician’s ear and purely theoretical tuning systems  was brought to8
the foreground and favour fell on the practicing musician.  The tone was set and musica theorica
fell by the wayside, while musica practica found its place at center stage. 
As the gap widened between these two approaches, the nature of philosophical discussions
regarding music changed.  Philosophy of music was no longer seeking out objective answers
because music was no longer viewed as an objective, scientific discipline.  The why in music began
taking its form in questions such as “why do I feel this way when I listen to this piece of music?”
as opposed to “why is it that consonant intervals adhere to consistent numerical ratios?”.  The
former question requires an answer that necessarily involves the subject experiencing the music. The
latter question, however, does not involve the subject at all, only the music, in and of itself, or,
music qua music.  It is time to turn back to music itself  –  its mathematical nature and the principle
of harmonia – in order to understand music for what it is, namely, a manifestation of eternal
principles that remain unchanged.  It is time to return musica theorica to its proper place in musical
and philosophical scholarship, where objective answers can be found, and music’s innate universal
nature is irrefutably revealed.  
This thesis begins with the Pythagoreans and the non-Pythagoreans in Greek Antiquity,
where tension between musica theorica and musica practica is evident, but music remains a
discipline understood first and foremost by its mathematical nature.  Chapter 2 continues the
discussion through the Middle Ages, focusing primarily on Boethius’ De institutione musica, and
then moves on to the Renaissance, where the tension between musica theorica and musica practica
 This is especially evident through correspondences; see Claude V. Palisca, Girolamo Mei: Letters on Ancient9
and Modern Music to Vinzenzo Galilei and Giovanni Bardi, Vol. 3 of  Musicological Studies and Documents, ed. by
Armen Carapetyan (American Institute of Musicology, 1960); Anthony Kenny, trans. and ed., Descartes: Philosophical
Letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1970.
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culminates in an ongoing controversy among musical scholars  that eventually does irreparable9
damage to music’s authoritative place among mathematics and science.  Chapter 3 offers several
contemporary theories in philosophy and music (such as Harold Fiske’s theory of emotion and music
and Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s theory of semiology) that unveil a firm ‘post-Renaissance’ conviction
that a theory of music must focus entirely on the subject experiencing the music, and not the music
itself.  The weaknesses that render these theories questionable will be made apparent, as will the
need to shift focus to the eternal and objective properties of music that have been neglected for so
long.
It is hoped that the reader will come away with a new, or renewed, respect for the
interdisciplinary nature of philosophy and music, and the realization that a philosophy of music can
reveal the objective and eternal nature of music qua music.
 See Thomas J. Mathiesen, “Harmonia and Ethos in Ancient Greek Music,” (part of Round Table: “The Ancient1
Greek Harmoniai, Tonoi and Octave Species in Theory and Practice,” organized and chaired by Claude V. Palisca at the
National Meeting of the American Musicological Society in Louisville, Kentucky, October 27, 1983), in: The Journal of
Musicology: a Quarterly Review of Music History, Criticism, Analysis and Performance Practice 3 (1984), pp. 242-251.
 What modern scholars know of ancient Greek music theory  implies that music was predominantly monophonic2
(two pitches sounding one after the other in a linear fashion). However, ‘concords’ (FL:NT<\"4) were understood
theoretically as two distinct pitches blended, or unified into a single element.  See Andrew Barker,  “Ptolemy’s,
Pythagoreans’, Archytas’s, and Plato’s conception of Mathematics,” in: Phronesis 39 (1994) pp. 113-135, especially
Footnote 5.  Two more excellent sources are Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo’s Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in
Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Vol. 2 of Publications of the Center for the History of Music Theory and Literature
(Lincoln, Nebraska and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999);  Andrew Barker, ed., Greek Musical Writings II:
Harmonic and Acoustic Theory ( Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, discussed in Chapter 3 below, holds that “music is whatever people choose to recognize3
as such, [and] noise is whatever is recognized as disturbing, unpleasant, or both”; see Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and
Discourse (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 47-48.   However, it should be noted that noise is not only
considered in its opposition to sonority, but also electronically as interference in the transference of heat, visually as snow
on a television screen, and even rumour, as opposed to fact.
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Chapter 2
A Return to Greek Antiquity: the Pythagoreans and Non-Pythagoreans
     
The term harmonia brings to mind  agreement, concordance, balance and proportion.  It is
thought to be the opposite of chaos, bringing together autonomous and often opposing elements, and
melding them into a melodious consonance: the duality of limited and unlimited, matter and form,
temporal and eternal.  The concept of harmonia is central in classical Greek thought;  D:@<\"
meaning literally to ‘fit together’.   From the fitting together of two pieces of wood to the underlying
principle in Greek cosmogony and cosmology, harmonia permeates every aspect of being – and
from the beginning it has been associated with music .1
Harmonia is understood as the unifying  principle that blends two distinct elements into a
single entity. Music manifests the very essence of this unity in sensible pleasure.  The pleasant
interval that results from two pitches, high and low,  sounding simultaneously is in fact the result
of perfect and invariable mathematical principles.   This is what distinguishes music from noise .2 3
 Although the basic principles of Ptolemy’s mathematical approach to music definitely lie within the Pythagorean4
camp (while at the same time recognizing the importance of sense perception), his Harmonica (second century C.E.) will
not be discussed in this chapter, but within the context of Boethius’ De institutione musica in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
 Walter Burkert,  Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, trans. by Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge,5
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 1.
 Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 28.6
-6-
Since mathematical principles that are evident in the natural order of the universe are also
demonstrated in what we call music,  it follows that any enquiry involving harmonics and acoustics
must also involve the study of mathematics.  The science of harmonics, however, can be reduced
to two distinct approaches in ancient Greece: the first is through the study of numerical ratios, the
second is strictly empirical.  This chapter will attempt to illustrate the tension between these two
approaches as it follows the development of musical thought from the Pythagoreans  (who saw4
music, number and the cosmos as interrelated, each an intrinsic part of the other two) through to the
phenomenological approach of Aristoxenus (who places music solely within the sphere of human
experience). The first section will focus on the Pythagoreans: Philolaus and Archytas; the second
section will focus on the ‘non-Pythagoreans’: Plato, Aristotle and Aristoxenus.
I          The Pythagoreans
The figure of Pythagoras is an elusive one: “The attempts of scholarship to grasp the
underlying historical reality keep getting entangled in contradictions; where some think they discern
the figure of a world-historical genius, others find little more than empty nothingness.”   He is5
mentioned only infrequently by earlier writers (such as Archytas and Philolaus), and all that we
know to date is that “early Pythagoreanism was more a set of practices than a body of doctrines.”6
Most of the philosophical treatises that are attributed to him are known to us only through other
 See, for example, Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras and Iamblichus’ Vita Pythagorica, which sought to present7
the life of Pythagoras in ten volumes, as ten was considered by Pythagoreans to be the perfect number.  For further
readings in ‘source problems’, see Walter Burkert, Lore and Science,  pp. 97-109.
 William Jordan writes: “It must be remembered that Pythagoreanism was not a specialized science, like modern8
physics, for it included elements of mysticism, political theory and ethics.  Furthermore, the underlying purpose of the
mathematical proofs of Pythagoreanism appears to have been more theological than scientific; those who adhered to the
Pythagorean views meditated on these proofs in order to develop spiritual awareness”; William Jordan, “Galileo and the
Demise of Pythagoreanism,” in: Music and Science in the Age of Galileo, ed. by Victor Coelho as Vol. 51 of The
University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, ed. by Robert E. Butts (Dordrecht, Netherlands and
Boston, Massachusetts; and London: Kuwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 45-63.
 For further reading on this subject, see André Barbera, “The Persistence of Pythagorean Mathematics in9
Ancient Musical Thought,” (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980); Barbara
Münxelhaus, Pythagoras musicus: Zur Rezeption der pythagoreischen Musiktheorie als quadrivialer Wissenschaft im
lateinischen Mittelalter, Vol. 19 of Orpheus-Schriftenreihe zu Grundfragen der Musik, ed. by Martin Vogel (Bonn-Bad
Godesberg: Verlag für Systematische Musikwissenschaft, 1976).
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Greek scholars  whose biases tend to tamper with the original Pythagorean doctrine.  Consequently7
it is up to present-day scholars to sift through these works in order to find a common thread that can
be genuinely ascribed to Pythagoras.  
We do know that Pythagoras was born in Samos in the sixth century B.C.E. and that his
teachings attracted a group of followers who were willing to embrace a way of life that was defined
by a strict set of morally based prohibitions and rituals.  These prohibitions and rituals were thought
to be necessary in achieving purification of the soul, the primary goal of the Pythagorean .  The8
purpose of this purification was to assist in the assimilation of the soul to the ordered unity of the
universe – a unity that consists of a system of parts that are held together in harmonious
collaboration.  Harmonia, therefore, is at the heart of Pythagorean inquiry and at the heart of
harmonia is number.
Arithmetic was the cornerstone of Pythagorean metaphysics; numbers were deemed by them
as fundamental constituents of reality.   Because the primary intervallic relations  in music can be9
expressed as numerical ratios, music was seen by the Pythagoreans as supervening upon every
 Despite Pythagoreanism being pushed into the background with seventeenth- century rationalism, and the fact10
that Pythagoras’ theory of proportion with regard to the planets has been proven wrong, the ideology behind the ‘harmony
of the spheres’ that permeated antiquity continues to intrigue scholars.  This is evident in such works as Johannes Kepler’s
Harmonices mundi (1619), Robert Fludd’s Utriusque cosmi (1617) and  Marin Mersenne (Harmonie universelle (1636)),
and contemporary works such as James Haar, Musica mundana: Variations on a Pythagorean Theme, (Unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1960); Marius Schneider, “Die musikalischen Grundlagen der Sphärenharmonie,”
in:  Acta Musicologica 32 (1960), pp. 136-151; Peter Bicknell, “Early Greek Knowledge of the Planets,” in: Eranos: Acta
Philologica Suecana 68 (1970), pp. 47-54; Hans Schavernoch, Die Harmonie der Sphären: Die Geschichte der Idee des
Welteinklangs und der Seelenstimmung, Vol.6 (Special Issue) of Orbis Academicus: Problemgeschichten der
Wissenschaft in Dokumenten und Darstellungen (Freiburg im Breisgau and Munich: Karl Alber, 1981); Friedrich Zipp,
Vom Urklang zur Weltharmonie: Werken and Wirken der Idee der Sphärenharmonie (Berlin and Kassel: Merseburger,
1985); Jamie James, The Music of the Spheres: Music, Science and the Natural Order of the Universe (New York: Grove
Press, 1993).  
 Put simply, the decad, or ten, is made up of one plus two plus three plus four.  Pythagoras has been cited as11
saying, “What you suppose is four is really ten, and a perfect triangle, and our Oath”; see Walter Burckert, Lore and
Science, p.72 (Footnote 120).  Further, the tetractys  represents point, line, plane and solid. Geometry, that takes its place
alongside music in the quadrivium, is derived from it: “Numbers gave rise to geometric figures: a second unit placed
alongside the first generated a line from a point, a third unit placed so as to form a triangle produced the basic two-
dimensional figure, and a fourth unit placed on top of these made a tetrahedron, the first three-dimensional figure”; see
Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece  (New York: Da Capo Press, 1975 is a reprint of New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 9. For a more comprehensive discussion on the tetractys, see Theo Reise, Das
Geheimnis der pythagoreischen Tetraktys, Vol. 3 of Harmonikale Studien (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1967); for
evidence of the tetractys in art history, see Julius Schwabe, “Hans Kaysers letzte Entdeckung: Die pythagroeische
Tetraktys auf Raffaels “Schule von Athen,” in: Symbolon: Jahrbuch für Symbolforschung 5 (1966), pp. 92-102; for a
classification of the Greek terms used here and below, see Solon Michaelides, The Music of Ancient Greece: An
Encyclopedia (London: Faber and Faber, 1978).
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aspect of cosmogony and cosmology .   Consequently, Pythagoras gave much theoretical attention10
to those numerical ratios that can be observed from a vibrating string.   
If one plucks a taut length of string, a pitch will sound. If that string is divided into two, and
one half of the string is plucked, then a pitch will sound that is identical but in a higher register, as
the string is vibrating exactly twice as fast.  The unified relation of two identical pitches, one
sounding high and the other low, provides us with the most consonant of intervals, the diapason
(octave).  The diapason can be expressed as the ratio 2:1 and is made up of two lesser consonant
intervals: the diapente (fifth - 3:2) and the diatessaron (fourth - 4:3). The four numbers that
comprise these three fundamental ratios of harmonia form the tetractys (J,JD"PJbH) of the decad
(Figure 1), the first principle of Pythagorean cosmology  :  “and it may well have seemed the11
 Walter Burkert,  Lore and Science, p. 478.12
 Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, pp. 9-10.13
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supreme manifestation of the mysterious power of the tetractys that the same first four numbers
express the basic ratios of the musical intervals.”              12
!
!  !
!  !  !
!  !  !  !
  
           Figure 1
The underlying principles of Pythagorean cosmogony are the paired contraries, the limited
and the unlimited and all numbers are seen to be generated by them.   Odd is seen as manifesting13
the principle of the limited (which is stable) and even is seen as manifesting the principle of the
unlimited (which is changing).   As we can see from the gnÇmÇn (literally a carpenter’s rule –
another symbolic figure offered by Pythagoras), all number is generated from the limited and the
unlimited:  odd is limited and square (Figure 2),  even is unlimited and oblong (Figure 3).  
The gnÇmÇn ((<f:T<)
! !  ! !k ! !  !   !   !k
! !  !k! ! !  !   !k  !
! !k ! ! ! !  !k  !   !
!k!  ! ! ! !k !   !   !
1, 3, 5, 7, etc.                                       2,      4,  6,  8, etc.
       odd, limited, square, stable                  even, unlimited, oblong, changing
Figure 2    Figure 3
 Philolaus, born  c. 470 BC, was a contemporary of Socrates.  An excellent source and commentary on the life14
and writings of Philolaus is Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic  (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
 Sir Thomas Heath, trans.,  Aristarchus of Samos: The Ancient Copernicus. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 195915
as reprint of first edition, 1913) p. 47.
 Fragment 10, attributed to Philolaus, as cited in Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, p. 416. See also16
Hermann Dies, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., ed. by Walther Kranz (Berlin-Grünewald: Weidmannsche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951-1952).
 Such as Lasus of Hermione(ca. 510 B.C.E.), Hippasus of Metapontum (ca. 500 B.C.E.), Philolaus (ca. 470-17
385 B.C.E.), Archytas of Tarentum (ca. 428-350 B.C.E.), Nicomachus (ca. 60-120 C.E.) and Aristides Quintilianus (ca.
third-century C.E.).  See Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, pp. 30-45 and Walter Burkert, Lore and
Science, Section II, pp. 97-217.
 Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 218.18
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Philolaus , the first known Pythagorean to write an exposition of the Pythagorean system,  argues14 15
that all things in the universe, including the soul, belong to distinct and contrary categories –  the
limiting and the unlimited (B,D"\<@<J" 6"4 B,4D" ) .  The limiting and the unlimited are wholly
distinct (associated with odd (B,D4FF`<) and even (DJ4@<), respectively)  and irreconcilable
without the third principle, the ‘One’, also known as harmonia (D:@<\"):  “Harmonia in every
way arises out of opposites. For harmonia is the unification of what is a mixture of many
ingredients, and the agreement of the disagreeing.”  16
Before discussing  the writings of Philolaus, or any of the early Pythagoreans, one must raise
the problem of authenticity, for there is a great deal of writing falsely attributed to Pythagoras and
his pupils .  Even in ancient times there was much debate over whether Pythagoras had written17
anything at all: “The opinion was widespread that no such book had been preserved, or even that
Pythagoras avoided the written word on principle and recorded his teachings only in the minds of
his disciples.”   As for Philolaus and Archytas, two renowned Pythagoreans, not much is known for18
 They  are, however, cited in many scholarly works throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, such19
as Franchino Gaffurio’s Theorica Musice (1492), see Clement A. Miller, trans. Franchinus Gaffurius: De harmonia
musicorum instrumentorum opus, Vol. 33 of Musicological Studies and Documents, ed. by Armen Carapetyan  (American
Institute of Musicology, 1977).  Further, according to a source attributed to Cicero (Cic. De oratore. 3.139),  Philolaus
is referred to as the teacher of Archytas;  see Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 228 (Footnote 50). 
 Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 36; Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, pp. 17-37;20
Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, pp. 238-276.
 Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 222.21
 For a more in depth discussion on authenticity, see Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, pp.97-109 and Carl22
A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, pp. 17-35.
 Philolaus, Fr. I, as cited in Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, p. 93.23
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certain.   Fragments attributed to Philolaus include many that are likely unauthentic,  and much19 20
of the written work that we have of Archytas is apocryphal.   Despite this difficulty, it is worthwhile21
to sift through the spurious bits to find the gems offered by these two influential Pythagoreans.22
Philolaus’ understanding of our world rests on the principle of harmonia (D:@<\") .  In the
most definitive sense, harmonia means ‘fitting together’, which is suitable if one is to posit a
principle that unites the distinct and separate constituents of a whole: “Nature in the world-order
was fitted together both out of things which are unlimited and out of things which are limiting, both
the world-order as a whole and all things in it.”   There is no doubt, however, that Philolaus utilizes23
this principle, first and foremost, in its musical sense.
Philolaus does not make any deep speculative inquiry into how Being (©FJf) comes into
existence, or its unifying principle, harmonia.  The world exists, and it is ordered.  What Philolaus
investigates are relationships, and he finds that our world is ordered according to number. Philolaus’
presuppositions begin with Being in general, then the opposition of limiting and unlimited, and
finally harmonia, which is expressed as a numerical relationship. Philolaus writes: 
 Fragment 6, as cited in Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, pp. 146-147.24
 This is discussed in further detail below in this chapter.25
 Note Aristotle,  On the Universe, 396b25 - 397a5 as found in: Clement A. Miller, trans. Franchinus Gaffurius:26
De harmonia.  Further evidence can be found in a source attributed to Cicero (Cic. De oratore 3.139).  
 Fragment 5, as cited in Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, p. 178.27
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The magnitude of harmonia (fitting together) is the fourth [diatessaron] and the fifth
[diapente]...the fifth is greater than the fourth by the ratio 9:8 [a tone].  For from
hypat [hBVJ0, or lowest tone] to the middle string mes (:XF0) is a fourth, and
from the middle string to neat [<,VJ0, or highest tone] is a fifth, but from neat
to the third string is a fourth, and from the third string to hypat is a fifth.  That
which is in between the third string and the middle string is the ratio 9:8 [a tone], the
fourth (diatessaron) has the ratio 4:3, the fifth (diapente) 3:2, and the octave
(diapason) 2:1. Thus the harmonia is five 9:8 ratios [tones] and two diesis [*\,F4H,
or smaller semitones].  The fifth is three 9:8 ratios [tones] and a diesis, and the fourth
two 9:8 ratios [tones] and a diesis.24
In this fragment, harmonia is considered in its musical sense  –  as a scale demarcated by the25
octave  (diapason) –   but the essence of musical harmonia is the same as that harmonia which binds
the limiter and the unlimited into the world as we know it.
For Philolaus, any philosophical or epistemological ideas are merely elucidating what exists
already, namely a world that consists of a pair of basic opposites, instantiated by the principle of
harmonia  and delimited by number.  He explicitly refuses to make any claims about Being qua26
Being (in contrast to Aristotle, which is discussed later).  His aim is to investigate the many
relationships of number.  To reiterate, Philolaus’ cosmos is made up of limiting and unlimited
(B,D"\<@<J" 6"4 B,4D" ) and the unifying principle harmonia (D:@<\").  He parallels  this
notion with  ‘odd’,’ even’, and ‘the One’: “Number indeed has two proper kinds, odd (B,D4FF`<)
and even (DJ4@<), and a third from both mixed together, the even-odd (DJ4@B©D4JJ@< ).  Of each
of the two kinds there are many forms, of which each thing itself gives signs.”   Just as the opposing27
 Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 264.28
 Philolaus posits harmonia as the binding principle of all that exists.  There is nothing in his fragments,29
however, indicating that he said anything about the harmony of the spheres.  Pythagoras held that the universe is
constructed in such a way that the motion of the seven heavenly bodies creates a  perfect harmony, each planet sounding
a note that corresponds to the notes of the Heptachord  (a scale comprised of seven pitches that are tuned to the diatonic
scale – fundamental in early Greek music). This would have caused problems for Philolaus, for according to his fragments,
the Pythagorean system is comprised of ten heavenly bodies which would have to correspond to ten notes (see Sir Thomas
Heath, trans., Aristarchus of Samos, Chpt. 12).  For a further explication on the symbolism pertaining to ancient Greek
number symbolism and the number seven, seeWilhelm Heinrich Roscher, Über Alter, Ursprung und Bedeutung der
hippokratischen Schrift von der Siebenzahl: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ältesten griechischen Philosophie und
Prosaliteratur, Vol. 28/5 of Abhandlungen der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der Königlich – Sächsischen
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1921); Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher, Die Sieben – und Neunzahl
im Kultus und Mythus der Griechen, nebst einem Anhang: Nachträge zu den “enneadischen und hebdomadischen Fristen
und Wochen” enthaltend, Vol. 24/1 of Abhandlungen der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der Königlich –
Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1904); Martin Vogel, “Die Zahl Sieben in der
spekulativen Musiktheorie” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Universität Bonn, 1953).
 See Philolaus’ Fragment 6 cited above in this thesis.30
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principle of limiting and unlimited is transcended by the synthesizing principle of harmonia, so the
opposing principle of odd and even is transcended by the synthesizing principle of the ‘even-odd ’,
or the One. Walter Burkert writes: “Without any doubt...the odd numbers are the limiting
(B,D"\<@<J") and the even the unlimited (B,4D") .  The DJ4@B©D4JJ@<, made from the mixture
of the two, is the BDJ@<  D:@FX<, that is, the One.”   Fragment five is particularly significant,28
as it is the only fragment of Philolaus that makes specific reference to number itself, and its
relationship to the world. All things contain number, and insofar as they consist of B,D"\<@<J"
they contain the odd, B,4D" they contain the even, and both are bound together in harmonia.29
Similarly, the even and the odd numbers that define the ratios intrinsic to musical intervals and the
diatonic scale, are bound together in harmonia.
The entire octave length scale can be described in terms of numerical ratios, and it is
Philolaus who provides us with the earliest written account of such a description.   The most30
fundamental intervals in music (as mentioned above) are that of the diapason (2:1), the diatessaron
 For reasons of clarity, henceforth I will refer to the diatessaron as a ‘fourth’, the diapente as a ‘fifth’, and the31
diapason as the‘octave’.
 For further explication of ‘addition’ and ‘subtraction’ of intervals, see André Barbera, “Pythagorean Scale,”32
in: The New Harvard Dictionary of Music, ed. by Don Michael Randel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986),
p. 673. 
 In Greek harmonic theory (as in music theory today) the tetrachord is considered to be a foundational building33
block of the musical scale.  It is generally divided into three intervals.  In Greek music, the intervals are subject to change.
Aristoxenus was the first to draw attention to the concept of genera. The genera is determined through moveable notes
within the tetrachord.  In other words, the two outer notes of the tetrachord are considered stable in pitch, while the two
middle notes are moveable, depending on what shade of music one wants to produce.  Aristoxenus labeled the three
genera of the tetrachord: the diatonic, the chromatic and the enharmonic (‘the oldest and finest’).  The interval size within
the parameters of the fixed notes differed according to which genera was being expressed, and consequently, the
numerical ratios expressing those intervals would differ accordingly.  See Annie Bélis, “Aristoxenus,” in: Dictionary of
Music and Musicians, 29 vols., ed. by Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell  (London: Macmillan, 2001), Vol.2, p. 2 and also
Archytas, below in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For further reading on the tetrachord, see André Barbera, “Arithmetic and
Geometric Divisions of the Tetrachord,” in: Journal of Music Theory 21 (1977), pp. 29-42.
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(4:3) and the diapente (3:2).  If we go up the interval of a fourth (diatessaron) from any given pitch,
and then up the interval of a fifth (diapente), the pitch that we arrive at will be an octave (diapason)
above the original pitch.   The octave can then be said to be made up of a fourth and a fifth, if the31
ratios that govern the fourth and the fifth are added by multiplying the terms (3:2 × 4:3 = 12:6 = 2:1).
The interval of the whole tone, which is regarded as the basic unit of the scale, is located,
respectively, between the pitch found a fourth above the original pitch and a fifth above the original
pitch.  This interval corresponds to the ratio 9:8, which is the difference of 3:2 and 4:3 (to subtract
ratios, one must divide the terms or cross multiply, hence 3:2 ÷ 4:3 = 3:2 × 3:4 = 9:8 ).  As the fifth32
can be regarded as a fourth plus the whole tone, so the octave can be regarded as two fourths plus
a whole tone.  The fourth consists of two whole tones plus a ‘remainder’, or  diesis (4:3 - (9:8)(9:8)
= 4:3 ÷ 81:64 = 4:3 × 64:81 = 256:243).  Philolaus’ diatonic scale thereby consists of the following
intervals: 9:8, 9:8, 256:243 (the fourth, or tetrachord ) plus the fifth, 9:8, 9:8, 9:8, 256:243 (in other33
 Plato adopts this scale as an intrinsic part of the world soul in the Timeaus (36a-b) which will be further34
explained below.
 Again, as expounded upon in Footnote 33 above, there were different species of scale in Greek music theory35
(the diatonic, the chromatic, and the enharmonic). These scales will be discussed briefly below in this thesis with Archytas.
 Although the majority of work attributed to Archytas is regarded as spurious, his treatise Harmonics is among36
those considered to be authentic.
 Archytas Fragment 1, as cited in Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 40.37
 The study of sound waves does well to support the Pythagorean approach to music – if one is to measure and38
chart the sound waves of the perfect fifth, perfect fourth and the perfect octave, one will discover that a distinct pattern
repeats itself.  When the same is done with dissonant intervals such as a major second, there is no distinct pattern.  The
study of sound waves was revived in the Renaissance under Giovanni Battista Benedetti (1530-1590) who investigated
the mechanics underlying the production of consonances which he discusses in works such as  Diversarum speculationum
mathematicarum & physicorum liber (1585) and in two undated letters addressed to Cipriano de Rore (1653);  see Claude
V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism in Musical Thought,” in Seventeenth Century Science and the Arts, ed. by Hedley
Howell Rhys (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 91-137; and Chapter 3 below in this thesis.
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words, a whole tone plus the fourth).  This fundamental division of the scale that Philolaus has34
revealed (and what we understand today as the major scale: whole-tone, whole-tone, semitone,
whole-tone, whole-tone, whole-tone, semitone) makes perfect mathematical sense.35
Archytas of Tarentum – a Greek mathematician and philosopher, and a contemporary of
Plato – took these fundamental arithmetic principles of Pythagorean harmonic theory a step
further.   First, he recognized that pitch is dependent upon the speed with which the sound is made36
and travels: “Now when things strike against our organ of perception, those that come swiftly and
powerfully from the impacts appear high-pitched, while those that come slowly and weakly seem
to be low-pitched.”  Archytas was only slightly misled, for he was correct in his assumption that37
pitch is somehow determined by the speed of vibrations.  It is not, however, the speed with which
sound travels from the object to the recipient that determines the pitch (all sounds travel at an equal
velocity given the same medium), but the number of sound waves within a measurement of time.38
Second, he made a serious attempt at reconciling the tension between the strictly mathematical
 Although Ptolemy (ca. 87-150 B.C.E.) criticizes Archytas’ division of the diatessaran (the fourth) and39
diapason (the octave), their approach is similar in that they both take the musician’s ear into consideration.  Ptolemy is
discussed in Chapter 3 below within the context of Boethius’ treatise on music.
 n+1: n;  see Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p.43 (Footnote 63). 40
 The modern major scale that we are familiar with adheres closely to Philolaus’ diatonic scale: (41 fourth 4:3)
whole tone 9:8 (fourth 4:3) = octave 2:1. However, our half-tones have been modified with equal temperament; see
Footnote 94 of this chapter and Footnotes 64 and 67 of Chapter 3 below in this thesis.  For a more detailed account of
these scales, see Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, pp. 46-52, and Cristiano M.L. Forster, “Greek
Classification of Ratios Tetrachords, Scales and Modes, ” in: Cristiano M.L. Forster, Musical Mathematics: Western
Tuning Theory and Practice, Chapter 10, Part II (2004), pp. 445-457. URL= http://www.chrysalis-
foundation.org./musical_mathematics.htm.
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approach to music, and the strictly empirical one.  For he recognized both the Philolaic diatonic
scale (usually referred to as the Pythagorean diatonic) which is based on pure mathematical
abstraction, and the fine tuning of the musician’s ear.  Archytas’ division of the octave deviates from
Philolaus’, but this is not a result of questionable mathematical theory on either part.  Using the
Pythagorean proportions of the scale as a starting point, Archytas created a mathematically rigorous
system of proportions that allows for the altered tuning of the musician.  39
Where Philolaus and his predecessors had devised a system that accounts for the
fundamental concords within the diatonic scale, Archytas devised a more thorough system that
includes the intervals within the tetrachord.  He believed not only that the tetrachord could be
divided in such a way that would reveal commensurate relations between the intervals, but that the
ratio of such intervals would be ‘epimoric’ (or superparticular).40
Archytas devised three different types of scales to depict three different genera, or shades:
the enharmonic, the chromatic, and the diatonic. The tetrachords that these respective scales are
built upon contain different interval sizes, and therefore different numerical ratios , yet all of the41
intervals ‘add up’ to the ratio that is the perfect octave:
 For further reading, see Martin Vogel, “Über die drei Tongeschlechter des Archytas,” in: Bericht über den42
Internationalen Musikwissenschaftlichen Kongreß Hamburg 1956, ed. by Walter Gerstenberg et al. (Kassel and Basel:
Bärenreiter, 1957), pp. 233-235.
 Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 51.43
 This altered specifically the ditone:  the true ditone in the Greek diatonic scale of Archytas’ time is 81:64, yet44
musicians found that diminishing it slightly created a sweeter sound  –  the interval then becomes what we know as the
major third whose ratio is 5:4 –  this actually supports Archytas’ position that harmonic theory can be can be reduced to
a mathematical system of epimoric ratios; see also Ptolemy in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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Enharmonic: (5:4, 36:35, 28:27) 9:8 (5:4, 36:35, 28:27) = 2:1 
          (5/4 × 36/35 × 28/27) = (5070/3780) = 4(r.1)/3 or 4 : 3                                  
        therefore: (fourth) whole tone (fourth) = octave
Chromatic:      (32:27, 243:224, 28:27) 9:8 (32:27, 243:224, 28:27) = 2:1
                        (32/27 × 243/224 × 28/27) = (217,726/163,296) = 4(r.2)/3 = 4 : 3
                               therefore: (fourth) whole tone (fourth) = octave
Diatonic: (9:8, 8:7, 28:27) 9:8 (9:8, 8:7, 28:27) = 2:1
                                    (9/8 × 8/7 × 28/27) = (2016/1512) = 4/3 = 4 : 3
                               therefore: (fourth) whole tone (fourth) = octave42
In his Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, Andrew Barker suggests that Archytas was pursuing
two goals: “He attempted both to analyze the attunements underlying contemporary musical
practice, and to reveal the principles of mathematical order on which they were based.”43
Consequently, the numerical ratios depicting the intervals within the tetrachords of the enharmonic
and the chromatic scales do not add up exactly to the perfect 4:3 ratio of the fourth.  The
discrepancy is minimal in both scales, however, and this is acceptable.  As Andrew Barker explains,
Archytas wanted to reveal the mathematical principles on which these scales are based.   He noticed
that musicians used the Pythagorean diatonic to tune their instruments, and then tweaked the strings
a bit to make particular intervals more consonant to the ear.  Archytas wanted to demonstrate that44
 The harmonic mean between two numbers is as follows  a: 2ab : b; therefore, the harmonic mean between 145
and 2 is 4                                                                                                             a+b                                                                              
              3
     The arithmetic mean between two numbers is as follows: a: a+b : b; therefore the arithmetic mean between 1 and 2
is 3 .                                            2  
    2  
 Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 49.46
 It is worthwhile to note that even scholars such as Franchino Gaffurio (1451-1522) who advocated47
Pythagorean tuning, could see that keyboards were tempered by flattening the fifth, Theorica musice (1496), Book 2,
Chapter 3, as translated by Walter K. Kreyszig, pp. 60-63; see Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 373.
-18-
‘sweetening the interval’ (and thereby altering the mathematical proportion of the interval) did not
conflict with the mathematical theory that revealed the ratios.  Hence there is a reconciliation of the
strictly mathematical and the strictly empirical.   
Archytas began with the Pythagorean diatonic, yet made further divisions by inserting the
harmonic and arithmetic means  within intervals in hopes of accounting for the discrepancies45
between the musicians ear and pure numerical proportion. Although he sought to create a
mathematically ordered system of epimoric ratios in his harmonic system (as mentioned above), his
chromatic scale reveals what appears to be inconsistencies.  On the one hand, his chromatic scale
may exemplify the fact that “[his] divisions present several features that no purely mathematical
principles will explain” ; on the other hand, he may have allowed for the discrepancy of ‘epimoric’46
ratios in this particular scale to account for the musician’s ear, while still arguing that the musician’s
natural ‘tuning’, or disposition of the ear, can be reduced to pure mathematical theory.47
II        The Non-Pythagoreans 
While Archytas attempted to reconcile the empirical level of musical practice with the
metaphysical level of pure mathematical theory, Plato turned away from the empirical entirely and
he “[rejected the Pythagoreans’] comparative measurements as the most contemptible
 Erich Frank, as cited in Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 373.48
 M. J. Inwood, “Platonism,” in: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford49
University Press, 1995), p. 686.
 A good thorough source is The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters, ed. by  Edith Hamilton50
and Huntington Cairns (New York: Pantheon Books, 1961). 
 Andrew Barker on Plato, as cited in:  Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 53.51
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empiricism.”   For Plato, the science of harmonics is supposed to reveal to us the innate nature of48
truth which transcends perceptual knowledge.  He considered music to be a reflection of the
construction of reality, not the result of one’s imagination or musicianship.  It was his view “that
logical and/or mathematical entities subsist independently both of the empirical world and of human
thought.”  As a result, he made it very clear that any attempt to develop a mathematical system49
based on the ear of actual musicians was futile.  Although Plato found within Archytas’ theory of
the harmonic and arithmetic means and proportion an ideal system of harmonics (as is expounded
upon at length in his Timaeus ), he considered the musician’s tuning an imperfect reflection of the50
actual mathematical principles inherent in music’s harmonic structure:
Just as geometry has as its subject matter such intelligible entities as
the square and the circle, which are not things that can be perceived,
and is not concerned with the description of the individual,
perceptible and approximate squares and circles that it uses in its
diagrams, so astronomy and harmonics are concerned with an ideal
mathematics of motion.  The visible movements of the stars and the
audible movements that constitute sounds are to be treated merely as
‘diagrams’ or perceptual aids, from which the mind can be led to a
grasp of the intelligible mathematical principles that perceptible
movements may imperfectly exhibit.51
In keeping with the Pythagorean tradition, Plato treats astronomy and harmonics as
interdependent.  The inherent mathematical principles of ratio and proportion that are revealed in
 Republic 530d; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.52
 Republic, 531a - 531d; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.53
 Timeaus 32a-b; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.54
 The influence of Philolaus and Archytas becomes especially apparent upon closer inspection of the Timeaus,55
as Plato utilizes Philolaus’ diatonic scale, and Archytas’ arithmetic and harmonic mean (see below in this chapter). Also,
Carl A. Huffman claims:  “It is common to refer to the Pythagorean influence of Plato, but the Pythagorean named is
usually Plato’s contemporary Archytas, who is mentioned in the seventh letter although not in any of the dialogues.  Yet,
there are persistent reports that make a connection between Plato and Philolaus.  A report by Hermippus...has Plato
himself buying a book from Philolaus’ relatives or else given the book as a reward for saving one of Philolaus’ students
from Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse.  Plato is said to have transcribed his Timeaus from this book which probably is
to be understood as written by Philolaus”; see Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, pp. 4-5.
 Timeaus, 35a - 36c; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. 56
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the science of harmonics are thought to be the same that govern motion in the heavens: “The eyes
are made for astronomy,’ I [Socrates] said, “and by the same token the ears are presumably made
for the type of movement that constitutes music.  If so, these branches of knowledge are allied to
each other.  This is what the Pythagoreans claim, and we should agree...”    However, as mentioned52
above, Plato deviates from the Pythagoreans, chastising them for engaging in an empirical line of
inquiry –  “They laboriously measure the interrelations between audible concords and sounds, which
is as useless an activity as anything astronomers get up to...They limit their research to the numbers
they can find within audible concords, but they fail to come up with general matters for elucidation,
such as which numbers form concords together and which do not, and why some do and some do
not.”   Pursuing a time consuming study of the mere ‘shadows of truth’ seems pointless to Plato.53
He does concede, however, that “...the body of the cosmos was harmonized by proportion
and brought into existence”  and he adopts much from Philolaus and Archytas .  As is evident from54 55
the passage below ,  his construction of the “World Soul”can be directly translated into a musical56
scale: 
 Note the similarities between Plato’s ‘Sameness” and “Difference” and Philolaus’ “Limiting” and “Unlimited”,57
as recorded in Philolaus, Fragment 1, cited in Carl A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, p. 93.
 These numbers (in square parenthesis) are arranged in two branches as follows, the left side displaying 2,58
2², 2³; the right side displaying 3, 3², 3³:
  1 
  2    3 
   4               9
    8                   27
 See p. 23 below in Chapter 2 of this thesis.59
 The arithmetic and harmonic means (that are borrowed directly from Archytus) are explained in Footnote 4560
above; see also Thomas J. Mathiesen,  Appollo’s Lyre, p. 427.
 A hemiolic interval (3:2) is the musical fifth; an epitritic interval (4:3) is the musical fourth; an epogdoic61
interval (9:8) is the musical whole tone.
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Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body,
to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject.  And he made
her out of the following elements and on this wise.  From the being which is
indivisible and unchangeable, and from that kind of being which is distributed
among bodies, he compounded a third and intermediate kind of being [@ÛF\"H].  He
did likewise with the Same ["â BXD4] and the Different [2"JXD@L] , blending57
together the indivisible kind of each with that which is portioned out in bodies.
Then, taking the three new elements, he mingled them all into one form,
compressing by force the reluctant and unsociable nature of the Different into the
Same.  When he had mingled them with the intermediate kind of being and out of
three made one, he again divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting,
each portion being a compound of the Same, the Different, and Being.  And he
proceeded to divide after this manner.  First of all, he took away one part of the
whole [1], and then he separated a second part which was double the first [2], and
then he took away a third part which was half as much again as the second and three
times as much as the first [3], and then he took a fourth part which was twice as
much as the second [4], and a fifth part which was three times the third [9], and a
sixth part which was eight times the first [8], and a seventh part which was twenty-
seven times the first [27].  After this he filled up the double intervals [that is,58
between 1, 2, 4, 8] and the triple [that is, between 1, 3, 9, 27] , cutting off yet other59
portions from the mixture and placing them in the intervals, so that in each interval
there were two kinds of means, the one exceeding and exceeded by equal parts of its
extremes [as for example, 1, 4/3, 2, in which the mean 4/3 is one third of 1 more than
1, and one third of two less than two], the other being that kind of mean which
exceeds and is exceeded by an equal number.    Where there were intervals of 3/260
[hemiolic], and of 4/3 [epitritic], and of 9/8 [epogdoic] made by the connecting terms
in the former intervals , and he filled up all the intervals of 4/3 [epitritics] with the61
 See p. 23 below Chapter 2 of this thesis.62
 For an detailed explanation of Plato’s ‘algebraic metaphor’ see Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato’s Mathematical63
Imagination: The Mathematical Passages in the Dialogues and Their Interpretation (Bloomington, Indiana and London:
Indiana University Press, 1954), pp. 227-229.
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interval of 9/8 [epogdoic], leaving a fraction over, and the interval which this
fraction expressed was in the ratio of 256 to 243. And thus the whole mixture out of
which he cut these portions was all exhausted by him.
It is obvious how important the principles of harmony and proportion are in Plato’s construction of
the universe.  The three constituents are: “Same” referring to its unchanging, indivisible and eternal
nature; “Different” referring to its changing, divisible and physical nature; and “Being” referring
to the synthesis of these two seemingly divergent principles.  This “World Soul” is thus divided into
proportions in accordance to the principles of harmony, and summarized into a “lambda”
configuration.   This lambda configuration illustrates the distinction between the odd numbers,62
representing ‘Same’ and the even numbers, representing ‘Different’ while Plato’s incorporation of
the basic principles of the diatonic scale of Philolaus (the fundamental ratios of the fourth, fifth and
the octave) and the more convoluted scales of Archytas (which add the harmonic and arithmetic
means), synthesizes the fundamental numbers in his harmoniously proportioned “World Soul”  :63
X : harmonic mean   ::    arithmetic mean : Y 
1
4/3            3/2
3/2                         2
2                       3
8/3                                      9/2
3                                              6
4                                   9 
16/3                                                    27/2
6                                                          18
8                                           27
  
 We can rationalize the ratios in Plato’s system, and see them in their musical form, if we multiply all the terms64
by 6.  Then the insertion of harmonic and arithmetic means between terms in the series of doubles, 6, 12, 24, 48, gives
us:
6, 8, 9,12 ,16, 18, 24, 32, 36, 48
and their insertion into the series of triples, 6, 18, 54, 162, gives us:
                   6, 9, 12, 18, 27, 36, 54, 81, 108, 162
If we combine these numbers into a new series (without doubling numbers) we get:
                  6, 8, 9, 12, 16, 18, 24, 27, 32, 36, 48, 54, 81, 108, 162      
Moving left to right, we can combine each number to its neighbour in the form of a ratio: 6:8, 8:9, 9:12, 12:16, 16:18,
etc. This series of numbers can now be reinterpreted as a fourth (6:8 = 3:4), tone (8:9), fourth (9:12 = 3:4) – making
up one octave;  fourth, tone, fourth – making up a second octave;  tone, tone, half-tone (fourth), tone, fourth – 
making up a third octave; then (oddly) a tone, fifth (2:3); followed by a fourth, fifth (tone + fourth) which makes up
a fourth octave.  In other words, this series of numbers can be translated as three octaves, each divided into two fourths
separated by a tone (one of the fourths being subdivided –  tone, tone, half-tone ) plus a tone and a fifth (which can also
be understood as a sixth) and another octave;  see Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, pp. 58-65; Jacques
Handschin, “The Timeaus Scale,” in: Musica Disciplina: A Yearbook of the History of Music 4 (1950), pp. 3-42;  Gerhard
Jahoda, “Die Tonleiter des Timaios - Bild und Abbild,” in: Festschrift Rudolf Haase, ed. by Werner Schulze (Eisenstadt:
Elfriede Rötzer, 1980), pp. 43-80.   
 The ‘Same’ corresponds to the outer sphere which are the fixed stars; ‘Different’ corresponds to the Sun,65
Moon and planets, each following a particular path of movement.
 The ‘intervals of the double and the triple’ correspond to the relative sizes of the seven circles – double66
intervals: (2:1), (4:2), (8:4) and triple intervals: (3:1), (9:3), (27:9);  see Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory,
p. 61.
 Timaeus 36c-d  The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.67
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Plato now applies these ratios  to the construction of the cosmos in an attempt to explain the motion64
of the sun, moon, planets and stars:
Next, then, he divided this whole compound along its length into two, and put them
together at their centers like an X: then he bent each around to meet itself in a circle,
fixing them to themselves and to each other at the point opposite to their first
junction, and he made them revolve with a circular motion in the same direction on
the same axis, making one of them the outer circle and the other the inner.  To the
outer movement he gave the name of the nature of the Same, and to the inner that
of the Different.  ...He gave predominance to the revolution of the Same and Like,65
for he allowed it to be single and undivided; but he divided the inner revolution six
times, making seven unequal circles, each based on the interval of the double and the
triple, so that there were three intervals of each kind  He commanded the circles to66
move in directions opposed to one another, three of them at the same speed, the
other four traveling at speeds different from those of each other and of the other
three, but rationally related to them.67
 Timeaus 35-36; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.68
Reference to the ‘harmony of the spheres’ is also made in Plato’s ‘Myth of Er’ where “Each of the [spindle of Necessity’s]
circles acted as the vehicle for a Siren.  Each Siren, as she stood on one of the circles, sounded a single note, and all eight
notes together made a single harmonious sound.  Three other women were also sitting on thrones which were evenly
spaced around the spindle.  They were the Fates, the daughters of Necessity, robed in white, with garlands on their heads;
they were Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, accompanying the Sirens’ song, with Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of
the present, and Atropos of the future”; Republic 617b-c; The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns.
 For further reading on Plato’s influence on Aristotle’s ideology, see Gottfried Marin, “Platons Lehre von der69
Zahl und ihre Darstellung durch Aristoteles,” in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 7 (1953), pp. 191-203. 
 Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 351; for further reading on the significance of the number 7, see70
Footnote 29 above in this chapter.
 This can be observed from a stringed musical instrument like the lyre. 71
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When Plato makes the claim that these speeds are ‘rationally related’, he is referring not only to the
ratios of whole numbers, but also to the fact that these ratios are mathematically and musically
apprehensible.  As Andrew Barker made abundantly clear above, Plato sees astronomy and
harmonics as representing an ‘ideal mathematics of motion’; it makes sense, therefore, that Plato
would see the seven circles and their movement as forming a harmoniously ordered series.
Astronomy and harmonia can only, according to Plato, represent the Ideal rational order, yet the
Pythagorean notion of a ‘harmony of the spheres’ is clearly alluded to in the above passages. 
Although the notion of a ‘harmony of spheres’ permeated Greek cosmology, and was
illustrated with the kind of colourful imagery that we find in Plato’s ‘Myth of Er’ , the notion of68
a ‘sounding’ harmony of the spheres was contested  –  in particular, by Aristotle.   This Pythagorean69
theory stems from the association of the “ancient and proverbial seven-stringed lyre’  with the70
notion that the planets are seven in number.  As numerical ratios inherent within the harmonic
relationship between distance and velocity  reveal how such a relationship manifests itself in a71
concordant musical sound,  this same theory, according to the Pythagoreans, can be applied to the
 On the Pythagoreans, Aristotle writes: “ ...since all other things appeared in their nature to be likenesses of72
numbers, and numbers to be first in the whole of nature, they came to the belief that the elements of numbers are the
elements of all things and that the whole heaven is a harmony and a number; Metaphysica, 985b30 - 986a 5, as found in
The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols., ed. by Jonathan Barnes as part of  Bollingen
Series LXXI/2 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
 De caelo, 290b12 - 291a6, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol.1, ed. by Jonathan Barnes.73
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uniform motion of the planets. Since a musical tone implies a uniform motion, the Pythagoreans
assumed that each planet ‘sounds’ a particular pitch, and that as the numerically relational distances
between the planets manifest the same numerical ratios of the diatonic scale, the heavens necessarily
resound in a kind of cosmic harmony.    In response to this ‘sounding’ harmony of the spheres,72
Aristotle writes:
From all this it is clear that the theory that the movement of the stars
produces a harmony, i.e. that the sounds they make are concordant, in spite of the
grace and originality with which it has been stated, is nevertheless untrue.  Some
thinkers suppose that the motion of bodies of that size must produce a noise, since
on our earth the motion of bodies far inferior in size and in speed of movement has
that effect.  Also, when the sun and the moon, they say, and all the stars, so great in
number and in size, are moving with so rapid a motion, how should they not produce
a sound immensely great?  Starting from this argument and from the observation that
their speeds, as measured by their distances, are in the same ratios as musical
concordances, they assert that the sound given forth by the circular movement of the
stars is a harmony.  Since, however, it appears unaccountable that we should not hear
this music, they explain this by saying that the sound is in our ears from the very
moment of birth and is thus indistinguishable from its contrary silence, since sound
and silence are discriminated by mutual contrast.  What happens to men, then, is just
what happens to coppersmiths, who are so accustomed to the noise of the smithy that
it makes no difference to them.  But, as we said before, melodious and poetical as
the theory is, it cannot be a true account of the facts. There is not only the absurdity
of our hearing nothing, the ground of which they try to remove, but also the fact that
no effect other than sensitive is produced upon us.  Excessive noises, we know,
shatter the solid bodies even of inanimate things...Indeed the reason why we do not
hear, and show in our bodies none of the effects of violent force, is easily given: it
is that there is no noise.73
However, the motive behind Aristotle’s response to the Pythagoreans’ resounding cosmic harmony
is not to undermine their position altogether, but to reinforce his own cosmogony:
 De caelo,291a7-291a25, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol.1, ed. by Jonathan Barnes.74
 De anima, 425b29 - 426a19, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol.1, ed. by Jonathan Barnes.75
 De anima., 426a28-30, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol.1, ed. by Jonathan Barnes.76
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But not only is the explanation evident; it is also a corroboration of the truth of the
views we have advanced.  For the very difficulty which made the Pythagoreans say
that the motion of the stars produces a concord corroborates our view.  Bodies
which are themselves in motion, produce noise and friction; but those which are
attached or fixed to a moving body, as the parts to a ship, can no more create noise,
than a ship on a river moving with the stream...Since, therefore, this effect is
evidently not produced, it follows that none of them can move with the motion either
of animate nature or of constraint.74
For Aristotle, philosophy and science are one and the same.  As a scientist, he always begins
with what is observable.  Hence, he makes the claim that “no effect other than sensitive [that of the
senses] is produced upon us.”  We can only know what is sensible: 
But when that which can hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is
sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound come about at the same
time...Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are one
actuality in spite of the difference between their modes of being, actual hearing and
actual sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and the same moment.75
In other words:  the sensible and the sensitive are in themselves potentialities and are actualized in
coming together; the tone that results from the actualization of both potentialities coming together
is in itself a concord; their relationship, therefore, is one of harmony and proportion –  “If voice is
a concord, and if the voice and the hearing of it are in one sense one and the same, and if concord
is a ratio, hearing as well as what is heard must be a ratio.”   Although Aristotle’s approach does76
not focus on the quantitative attributes of concordant sound but rather its qualitative nature, he still
concedes that inherent within concordant sound is harmonia, and that harmonia implies the
presence of a mean, that is, between the potentiality of that which sounds and the potentiality of the
 Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, p. 140.77
 For example, a cat is necessarily a mammal, but only accidentally black. 78
  Analytica posteriora, 75a38-39; The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1, ed. by Jonathan Barnes. For a more79
thorough argument, see Analytica posteriora 75a29 - 75b20, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1, ed. by Jonathan
Barnes.
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sense-organ which perceives it.77
Aristotle’s primary goal in his approach to music is to seek out an explanation; he wants to
ascertain the ‘why’ of concords.  To do this, he claims that one must begin with what is observed.
One must then determine what qualities of a thing are necessary attributes and what are accidental
attributes. The former refers to those attributes that are necessarily included in the definition of a
thing; the latter refers to those attributes which are not.  A thing is then categorized into its78
particular genus or domain in accordance with its necessary attributes: a triangle will fall under the
domain of ‘geometry,’ a sound will fall under the domain of ‘harmonics’, and so forth.  According
to Aristotle, scientific explanation is achieved through a deductive demonstration in the form of a
syllogism (a deductive argument whereby a conclusion  follows necessarily from two premises).
Consequently, one must appeal to the genus (or domain) within which a thing belongs in order to
provide a true explanation of that thing  –  “One cannot, therefore, prove anything by crossing from
another genus –  e.g. something geometrical by arithmetic.”    There are, however, exceptions to79
this general rule, harmonics being one of them:
Thus with regard to the same science (and with regard to the position of the
middle terms) there are these differences between the deduction of the fact and that
of the reason why.
The reason why differs from the fact in another fashion, when each is
considered by means of a different science.  And such are those which are related to
each other in such a way that the one is under the other, e.g. optics to geometry, and
mechanics to solid geometry, and harmonics to arithmetic, and star-gazing to
astronomy.  Some of these sciences bear almost the same name – e.g.  mathematical
 Ibid. 78b32 - 79a7.80
 For further reading on Aristotle’s empirical data with regard to acoustics, see Alan Towey, “Aristotle and81
Alexander On Hearing and Instantaneous Change: A Dilemma in Aristotle’s Account of Hearing,” in: The Second Sense:
Studies in Hearing and Musical Judgment from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, ed. by Charles Burnett et al. as
Vol. 22 of Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, ed. by Jill Kraye and W.F. Ryan (London: The Warburg Institute and
University of London, 1991), pp. 7-18.
 Aristoxenus was the son of a musician, born in Tarentum in the fourth century B.C.E. while Archytas, also82
from Tarentum, was still alive.  He wrote hundreds of books on a wide variety of subjects – most notably music,
philosophy , history and a number of biographies on figures such as Pythagoras, Archytas, Socrates and Plato; see Annie
Bélis, “Aristoxenus,” pp. 1-2;  Richard L. Crocker, “Aristoxenus and Greek Mathematics,” in: Aspects of Medieval and
Renaissance Music: A Birthday Offering to Gustave Reese, ed. by Jan La Rue et al. (London: Oxford University Press,
1967), pp. 96-110.  
 Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, p. 144.83
 Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 68.84
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and nautical astronomy, and mathematical and acoustical harmonics.  For here it is
for the empirical scientists to know the fact and for the mathematical to know the
reason why; for the latter have the demonstrations of the explanations, and often they
do not know the fact, just as those who consider the universal often do not know
some of the particulars through lack of observation.80
 Aristotle holds, therefore, that the qualitative attributes of harmonics that are perceived
empirically  can be described in terms of their quantitative attributes.  In other words, one will81
perceive (hear) the fact that an interval is concordant (the octave, for example), and in determining
the reason why it is concordant, one can ascertain an explanation through mathematics.  Such a
mathematical explanation can be abstracted and considered independently of its original empirical
source.  In this way, Aristotle has brought the observation of empirical phenomena (the caused)
together with pure mathematics (the cause).
Aristoxenus , a student of Aristotle’s and considered to be one of the greatest musical82
authorities of antiquity , “speaks as a purer Aristotelian than Aristotle himself.”   He chose to83 84
disregard the purely mathematical approach altogether, treating the science of harmonics as a
 See Malcolm Lichtfield, “Aristoxenos and Emiricism: A Reevaluation Based on His Theories,” in: Journal85
of Music Theory 32/1 (Spring 1988), pp. 51-73.
 Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory. p. 68.  86
 Melos can mean  (1) the song which includes melody, rhythm and words, (2) the melody itself or (3) the87
melodic series or scale on which a melody is based; see Andrew Barker Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 126. 
 Ibid. p. 126.88
 Aristoxenus, Harmonica, Book 1; Henry Stewart Macran, ed., !C3GI?=+;?K  !C9?;35!89
EI?3O+3!: The Harmonics of Aristoxenus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), p. 165.
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rigorously empirical discipline : our world can only be understood as phenomena and species of85
phenomena .   Harmonics itself is considered a species of melody (:X8@H) , as Aristoxenus writes86 87
in his Elementa Harmonica:  
The branch of study which bears the name of Harmonic is to be regarded as one of
the several divisions or special sciences embraced by the general science that
concerns itself with Melody.  Among these special sciences Harmonic occupies a
primary and fundamental position; its subject matter consists of the fundamental
principles – all that relates to the theory of scales [systmata: any acceptable series
of intervals, even as few as two ] and keys [tonoi: ‘shade’ or ‘mode’]; and this once88
mastered, our knowledge of the science fulfils every just requirement, because it is
in such mastery that its aim consists.    89
Aristoxenus holds that the study of harmonics is based on the study of empirical phenomena,
thereby placing an emphasis on sense perception. We begin with what is perceived and go from
there.  According to Aristoxenus, there is no exception to Aristotle’s general rule of scientific
explanation; the empirical phenomena that fall under the title ‘harmonics’ are not explicable
through mathematics.  Whereas Aristotle begins with what is perceived and, in the case of
harmonics, turns to the science of mathematics to understand the why, Aristoxenus stays within the
realm of phenomenology: “The fundamental position of the ear remains unassailable; it can neither
 Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, p. 150.90
 Aristoxenus , Harmonic Elements, as cited in Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, 91
p. 148.
 Edward A. Lippman, Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, p. 149.92
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be invaded by reason nor reduced to mathematical or physical principles.”   He is not concerned90
with the mathematical ratios inherent in the physical ‘making’ of a sound – the why; he is only
interested in the object of perception itself – the fact.  
Aristoxenus chooses melody as his object of study.  Best represented in the human voice,
melody, like speech, it a continuum which is made of smaller constituents and is bound by the
principles of harmonics.  He writes: 
Continuity in melody seems in its nature to correspond to that continuity in speech
which is observable in the collocation of the letters.  In speaking, the voice by a
natural law places one letter first in each syllable, another second, another third,
another fourth, and so on. This is done in no random order; rather, the growth of the
whole from the parts follows a natural law.  Similarly in singing, the voice seems to
arrange its intervals and notes on a principle of continuity, observing a natural law
of collocation, and not placing any interval at random after any other, whether equal
or unequal.    91
Unlike Plato, who considered music produced by musicians to be a mere distorted shadow
of the eternal Form of Music, Aristoxenus would have sense perception woven into the very fabric
of music: sense perception comes first, and is therefore vital to the student of musical science.  If
one begins with faulty data, then it is impossible to pursue those questions that transcend what is
perceived.   A scientific approach to music, according to Aristoxenus,  involves two distinct and92
autonomous faculties, that of hearing and that of the intellect. Each faculty performs a vital role –
“by the former we judge the magnitudes of the intervals, by the latter we contemplate the functions
 Ibid. p. 149.93
 The measure of the half-tone inevitably changes as one climbs by fifths (the diapente).  After one has94
completed seven octaves and has returned to the original note name, there is a discrepancy in pitch.  This discrepancy is
known as the Pythagorean comma.  The only way that one can return to the original note acoustically is to have all of
the half-tones of equal measure, hence the equal temperament that we are accustomed to now.  Such inconsistencies in
Pythagorean music theory do not, however, preclude that there are no governing mathematical principles in the science
of harmonics; see Chapter 3 (Footnote 67) below in this thesis.  For a complete explication of the Greek musical scale,
see Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, pp. 46-52; see also André Barbera, “Pythagorean Scale,” in: The
New Harvard Dictionary of Music, ed. by Don Michael Randel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 673.
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of the notes.”     It is the job of one who undertakes the science of harmonics to observe the object93
of perception (melody, or :X8@H), clarify the concepts and terminology that specifically fall under
the domain of ‘harmonics’, and classify and categorize the phenomena perceived.
It has been established that sense perception takes a primary role in Aristoxenus’
methodology.  Consequently, what determines ‘concord’ and ‘discord’ in melody cannot be found
merely in numerical ratios.  The size of the intervals and the succession of pitches is not determined
directly by mathematical principles, but instead by the consistent harmonic laws that govern the
intervals and pitches to create what the ear hears as concordance.  Yet, what governs these laws?
It is here that his approach seems incomplete.  
Aristoxenus holds that concord and discord are simply relational ideas –  there is no reason
to delve into the why (as Aristotle did) of musical concordance, the ear will perceive it as such, or
not.  For example, if one takes a purely mathematical approach and merely applies the Pythagorean
mathematical principles to the diatonic scale, then inconsistencies occur.    Aristoxenus claims that94
what the science of harmonics boils down to is what one hears. Intervals are consonant, not because
of governing mathematical principles (that may prove to be inconsistent), but because we hear them
as consonant.  Dissonance is understood in relation to consonance – the less consonant the interval
is to the ear, the more dissonant the interval is perceived to be, and the more displeasing it is for the
 See “Aristoxenus Redeemed in the Renaissance,” in: Claude V.  Palisca, Studies in the History of Italian95
Music and Music Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 189-199; Annie Bélis, “Aristoxenus,” pp.1-2; Andrew
Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 124.
 The closest any theorist came to resolving the tension between the two is Ptolemy, who will be discussed in96
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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listener.  For Aristoxenus, it makes far more sense to determine the degree of consonance in a
relational way from what we have perceived, rather than through a recognition of mathematical
consistencies or inconsistencies.  Whether or not the numerical ratios work, the ear will always hear
what it hears.  
Aristoxenus kept the science of harmonics exclusively within the empirical realm and he was
extremely successful in creating a methodological theory of music for practicing musicians.  He was
extremely prolific, and, starting from the very basics, was the first to make an attempt at systemizing
music in all of its complexities, articulating such nuances as tonoi (referring to the different shades
of genera, or modes, of music) and melodic systmata.  Very few revisions were made to his
compendium by later harmonic theorists, and our understanding of Greek music theory today owes
much to his principal work, !D:@<46"  EJ@4P,4",, or Harmonic Elements.  However, if95
Aristoxenus were to investigate the laws of harmony further – if he were to inquire more into the
why of concordance and not merely the fact of it – then perhaps he would not have been able to deny
the correlation of concordance with the consistency of specific numerical ratios. In other words, an
interval deemed ‘consonant’ by a musician because of its sweetness, is consonant – and sweet –
because of governing mathematical principles.
As this chapter has revealed, the tension that existed between the purely mathematical
approach and the strictly empirical approach to the science of harmonics in Greek Antiquity was
never resolved.   Yet, despite fact that the purely mathematical approach of the Pythagoreans and96
 See Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 371;  Claude V. Palicsa, “Boethius in the Renaissance,” pp. 259-97
280.
 Note that as early as the late fifteenth century, musical scholars such as Franchino Gaffurio devoted separate98
volumes to musica theorica, see his Theorica musice (1492) and Practica musicae (1496); see also Claude V. Palisca,
“Theory, theorists,” pp. 371-373; Clement A. Miller, trans. Franchinus Gaffurius.
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purely empirical approach of Aristoxenus represent two distinct and core components to this
tension, it was generally understood that the discipline of music was as rigorous as any science.  It
was not until the Renaissance that controversy arose regarding music’s place as one of the four
branches of mathematics found in the quadrivium (along with geometry, arithmetic and astronomy).
Boethius’ De institutione musica (Fundamentals of Music ), a mathematically based treatise of
music theory which served as the authoritative text in musical study throughout the Middle Ages,
underwent a revival in the Renaissance which kindled two opposite reactions: one which praised
his purely theoretical approach, another which sparked an anti-theoretical movement.   The97
controversy that ensued resulted in a complete about-face with regard to the discipline of music.
No longer was music viewed as a rigorous science, with underpinnings of mathematical theory.  By
the end of the sixteenth century, music came to be seen in a strictly aesthetic light; its epicenter
shifting from musica theorica to musica practica, from the theory - based musician to the practicing
one.   As the following chapters will reveal, however, this shift of focus from the theoretical to the98
practical does not preclude the absence of inherent and governing mathematical principles.
 See Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 371; Claude V. Palisca, “Boethius in the Renaissance,” ed. by1
André Barbera, pp. 259-280.
 Two authoritative texts on Boethius’ De institutione musica are: Roger L. Bragard. “Les sources du ‘De2
institutione musica’ de Boèce,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Université de Liège, 1926); Calvin Bower, “Boethius’
De institutione musica: A Handlist of Manuscripts,” in: Scriptorium 42 (1988), pp. 205-251.
 Claude V. Palisca, “Preface,” in: Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, p. xiv.3
 Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, p. xxiv.4
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Chapter 3
An Extension of Pythagorean Thought into the Middle Ages and the Ensuing Controversy:
From Boethius to Descartes
     
The distinction between musica theorica and musica practica surfaces in late antiquity and
becomes the focus of much debate in the Renaissance.  The ‘bible’ of musica theorica, and the1
source of inspiration and contention for many music scholars of that time is Boethius’ De
institutione musica (Fundamentals of Music) .  Written at the turn of the sixth century C.E., this text2
provides modern-day scholars with a great insight into Western Medieval music theory and how it
evolved , as it was acknowledged as the primary authoritative source in music theory (especially3
with regard to music’s mathematical nature) during the Middle Ages.  Furthermore, the De
institutione musica is a work based on the premise of reconciliation between faith and reason; it is
no wonder that this seminal treatise played a central role in the discipline of music between the
ninth and sixteenth centuries, when philosophy’s ultimate purpose was seen as a means of
accomplishing beatification through the faculties of the intellect.  It is of the utmost importance
when approaching this particular work that one takes into consideration the context from which it
was written, for Boethius’ treatise on music is an attempt to reveal the basic truths of mathematics
and music.    One of his earliest works, the De insitutione musica  “was intended to be read along4
 Books 2 and 3 of Fundamentals of Music make constant reference to Fundamentals of Arithmetic, as logical5
demonstrations of the mathematical (and abstract) core of music theory is presented.  For a comprehensive discussion
on Boethius’ two seminal treatises, see Gottfried Friedlein, ed., Anicii Manlii Torquati Severini Boetii: Institutione
arithmetica libri duo e Institutione musica libri quinque accedit Geometria quae fertur Boetii (Frankfurt am Main:
Minerva, 1966 is reprint of Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1867); John Caldwell, “The De institutione arithmetica and the De
institutione musica,” in: Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. by Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1981), pp. 135-154; Michael Masi, “The Influence of Boethius’ De Arithmetica: On Late Medieval Mathematics,” in:
Boethius and the Liberal Arts, ed. by Michael Masi as, Vol. 18 of Utah Studies in Literature and Linguistics (Berne and
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1981), pp. 81-95. 
 Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, p. xix.6
 This work was written while in prison awaiting execution (524) and is concerned, among other things, with7
the problem of evil. For a comprehensive study of the Consolation of Philosophy, see Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The
Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983 is a reprint of 1981); David S.
Chamberlain, “Philosophy of Music in the ‘Consolatio’ of Boethius,” in: Speculum 45 (1970), pp. 80-97.
 His vast collection of translations include: Aristotle’s Categories; Ptolemy’s Haromoncia;  Nicomachus’8
Eisagoge arithmetica and Eisagoge musica; Plato’s Symposium and Timaeus; Euclid’s Elementa; among others, see
Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, pp. xxiv-xxix.
 Claude V. Palisca quotes fifteenth-century scholar Johannes Gallicus as saying “that Music, which the so often9
mentioned Boethius turned into Latin from the Greek” (ea namque musica, quam totiens allegatus Boethius de Graeco
vertit in latinum); see Claude V. Palisca, “Boethius in the Renaissance,” p. 260.
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with the De institutione arithmetica  and may have been one of four works setting out the5
foundations of Platonic scientific education: arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy [the
quadrivium].”   What will follow in this chapter is an explication of the shift that occurred in the6
discipline of music during the Renaissance, from the musica theorica to the musica practica, with
Boethius’ monumental De institutione musica serving as the pivotal point.    
Boethius was born into a wealthy, prominent family of Rome around 475 C.E. and received
a well-rounded and liberal education.  Although most famous for his Consolation of Philosophy ,7
he is also known (and appreciated) for undertaking the daunting task of translating from Greek into
Latin (with commentary) the works of Euclid, the Pythagoreans, Nicomachus, Ptolemy, Plato and
Aristotle . As Calvin Bower notes: 8
Boethius carried the genre [of translating Greek scholars of antiquity into Latin ] to9
new levels of rigor and thoroughness.  Written for a cultural elite already initiated
 Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, p. xx.10
 Consequently, his treatises were not contested until the fifteenth century, when scholars took a renewed11
interest in reading sources in their original Greek; see Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,”  p. 363.
 Primarily Nicomachus’ Eisagoge arithmetica and Eisagoge musica.  For an English translation of the12
Eisagoge arithmetica, see Frank Egelston Robbins and Louis Charles Karpinski, Introduction to Arithmetic, with Studies
in Greek Arithmetic, translated by Martin Luther D’Ooge, Vol 16 of University of Michigan Humanistic Studies Series
(New York: Johnson Reprint, 1972 is reprint of 1926); see also, George Johnson, The Arithmetic Philosophy of
Nicomachus of Gerasa (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: Press of the New Era Printing Company, 1916).  For further readings
on Boethius and Nicomachus, see Calvin Bower, “Boethius and Nicomachus: An Essay Concerning the Sources of De
institutione musica,” in: Vivarium: An International Journal for the Philosophy and Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages
and Renaissance 16 (1978), pp.1-45; Flora Rose Levin, The Harmonics of Nicomachus and the Pythagorean Tradition,
Vol.1 of American Classical Studies (University Park, Pennsylvania: The American Philological Association, 1975); Jay
Kappraff, “The Arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasaand and its Applications to Systems of Proportion,” Nexus Network
Journal, 2/4 (October, 2002), URL = http://www.nexusjournal.com/kappraff.html; Thomas J. Mathiesen, Apollo’s Lyre,
pp. 390-411.
 Primarily Ptolemy’s Harmonics. For a good overview of Ptolemy, see Thomas J. Mathiesen, Appollo’s Lyre,13
pp. 429-495.
 Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, p. xxxi.14
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into philosophical literature, Boethius’ mathematical and logical works represent one
of the most notable projects in intellectual history of preserving and transmitting a
corpus of knowledge from one culture to another.   10
It was not until the ninth century that  liberal learning resurfaced in the West.  As Boethius was one
of the few reliable sources of Greek texts translated into Latin, he inadvertently became the pivotal
source of Greek antiquity offered in Europe for many centuries thereafter.  11
The Fundamentals of Music is not merely a translation of Greek texts, most notably
Nicomachus  and Ptolemy of the second century C.E., but an attempt to incite his reader, through12 13
music theory, to pursue the study of philosophy. For Boethius the true musician is not one who
sings, or masters his instrument, or even composes; the true musician is the philosopher who
“masters and applies the speculative principles of the discipline.”   This is the underlying thesis that14
guides Boethius through each of the five books of this treatise.  To fully understand the controversy
that surfaced during the Renaissance, a brief synopsis of these five books is in order.
 In the prologue of Book I Boethius relays the story of Pythagoras’ calming a drunken youth who was15
apparently incited by the Phrygian mode into acts of violence. Pythagoras placated him into a serene state of mind by
playing a mode known for its calming effect.
 For example, Boethius briefly discusses the use of various modes that are used to manipulate emotion, and16
how they have been utilized in the education of children –  Plato discusses this in his Republic 398c - 403c; see The
Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.
 For further reading see Jean Edmiston, “Boethius on Pythagorean Music,” in: The Music Review 35 (1974),17
pp. 179-184.
 For a more in depth discussion on Pythagorean music, see Barbara Münxelhaus, Pythagoras musicus.18
  Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, Chapters 28-32 of Book I [220-223].19
 The ‘intermingling’ of the high and low which produces a sweet sound is the coalescing of two sound waves20
in a concordant mathematical relationship; see Footnote 61 below.  Boethius would not have known this, however, as
experiments in sound-waves and frequencies did not become commonplace and documented until the Renaissance. For
a comprehensive discussion of sound perception in the Middle Ages, see Charles Burnett, “Sound and Its Perception in
the Middle Ages,” in : The Second Sense: Studies in Hearing and Musical Judgment from Antiquity to the Seventeenth
Century, ed. by Jill Kraye and W.F. Ryan (London: The Warburg Institute and University of London, 1991), pp. 43-70.
 Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, Book 1, Chapter 28 [220]; see Footnote 61 below21
in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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The prologue of Book I sets the climate of the treatise.  Combining myth  and fact,15 16
Boethius draws the reader into the Pythagorean mind-set :  that because of its mathematical nature,17
music not only permeates our own human existence, but is a fundamental – and governing –
constituent of the universe itself.  The purpose of the first book is to introduce the basic tenets of
Pythagorean music theory  (intervals and ratios based on Pythagorean principles) which will18
provide the basic building blocks of the books to come.  In an extremely important section of this
book   Boethius introduces the theory of consonances:19
When two strings, one of which is lower, are stretched and struck at the same time,
and they produce, so to speak, an intermingled and sweet sound, and the two pitches
coalesce into one as if linked together, then that which is called ‘consonance’
occurs.   When, on the other hand, they are struck at the same time and each desires20
to go its own way, and they do not bring together a sweet sound in the ear, a single
sound composed of two, then this is what is called  ‘dissonance’.”    21
 It is important to note here that the octave, and the fifth, are found to play a vital role in all music cross-22
culturally. See Chapter 4 of this thesis.
 Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower , Book 1, Chapter 34 [224-227]. 23
 Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, p. xxxi.24
 The monochord can be described as a zither with a single string stretched over a rectangular sound box, with25
a movable bridge.  The divisions of the string according to mathematical ratios (corresponding to various intervals) are
marked on the sound box.  For further readings on the division of the monochord, see Sigfrid Wantzloeben, Das
Monochord als Instrument und als System entwicklungsgeschichtlich dargestellt (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer,
1911); Thomas J. Mathiesen, “An Annotated Translation of Euclid’s Division of a Monochord,” in: Journal of Music
Theory 19 (1975), pp. 236-258; Joseph F. Smith, “The Medieval Monochord,” in: Journal of Musicological Research
5 (1984), pp. 1-33.
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He goes on to discuss the mathematical ratios inherent in the ‘sweet sound’ of consonance, and how
these ratios are commensurable with each other and how some consonances take precedence over
others, depending upon how easily the intervals’ inherent ratios are grasped by the intellect (hence,
the octave [2:1] takes precedence over, say, the fifth [3:2]).   He ends this first book with a bold22
claim that beautifully illustrates his position: “ How much nobler, then, is the study of music as a
rational discipline than is composition and performance!  It is as much nobler as the mind is superior
to the body; for devoid of reason, one remains in servitude.”23
Books  II and III are “relentlessly technical,”  making continuous reference to Fundamentals24
of Arithmetic, firmly placing music as one of the four mathematical disciplines of the quadrivium,
and demonstrating the quantitative basis for each interval introduced in Book I.  At the heart of
Book IV lies the division of the monochord,   based again on Pythagorean mathematical principles25
and the Pythagorean division of the monochord, and Boethius’ claim that reason does not contradict
sense perception (that is, the correlation of consonance and dissonance with mathematical ratio).
Boethius’ description of Greek notation and the division of the monochord  help to illustrate the
 See Archytas and Aristoxenus above in Chapter 2 of this thesis. For a full explication of tonoi, or JÏ<@H, see26
Solon Michaelidess, The Music of Ancient Greece, pp. 335-340; Jon Solomon, “Towards a History of Tonoi” (part of
Round Table: “The Ancient Greek Harmoniai, Tonoi and Octave Species in Theory and Practice,” organized and chaired
by Claude V. Palisca at the National Meeting of the American Musicological Society in Louisville, Kentucky, Oct. 27,
1983), in: The Journal of Musicology: A Quarterly Review of Music History, Criticism, Analysis and Performance
Practice 3 (1984), pp. 242-251.
 Ptolemy worked in Egypt in the second century C.E. For a good overview of Ptolemy, see Andrew Barker,27
Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, p. 270.
 In proving the reconciliation of the senses with the faculty of reason in musical experience, Boethius supports28
his own premise of the reconciliation of faith and reason mentioned above in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
 However, Ptolemy leans toward reason; see Ptolemy Harmonics, as cited in Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius,29
Fundamentals of Music, p. xxxv.
 In the first four books of Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, music treated as one of the four mathematical30
disciplines necessary in the study of philosophy; in this passage, Boethius borrows from Ptolomy’s Harmonica 1.1 as he
posits ‘hearing’ and ‘reason’ as necessary criteria for the study of Harmonics; see Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius,
Fundamentals of Music, p.163 (Footnote 3).
 Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, Book 5, Chapter 2 [352-355].31
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system of tonoi (genera, or shades)  or what we would understand as (and he calls) ‘modes’.26
Book V is for the most part an exposition of Ptolemy’s Harmonica .  Boethius wants to27
prove that rational thought and the senses are not irreconcilable  (hence,  musica theorica is vital28
to our understanding of what the ear hears as consonant) and Boethius will use Ptolemy’s
Harmonica to back up his claim.  Boethius’ recurring argument – that judgements of reason are
compatible with  those determined by the senses – crystallizes with Ptolemy’s harmonic theory. As
Ptolemy relies on both reason and the senses , so does Boethius make the following claim: 29
Harmonics is the faculty that weighs differences between high and low sounds using
the sense of hearing and reason.  For sense and reason are, as it were, particular
instruments [or criteria ] for the faculty of harmonics...[the sense of hearing] grasps30
differences between neighboring pitches by means of the sense, [reason] considers
the integral measure and quantity of these same differences.   31
 
Up until now, the Fundamentals of Music has focused solely on Pythagorean doctrine, and
the only cited authoritative critic of the Pythagoreans thus far has been Ptolemy.  It is in Book V,
 Ibid., Book 5, Chapter 1 [351].32
 See Walter Burkert, Lore and Science, pp. 369-386; Andrew Barker,  Harmonic and Acoustic Theory, pp.33
39-42; Barbara Münxelhaus, Pythagoras musicus.
 An example of this is the Pythagorean rejection of the consonant sounding interval of the diapason-plus-34
diatessaron (the octave plus the fourth) based on its mathematical ratio.  Ptolemy felt that the Pythagoreans’ mathematical
classifications were too limited.
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however,  that Boethius chooses to discuss “those matters about which ancient musical scholars
express contradictory opinions.”   Once again, the tension between the purely mathematical32
approach and the strictly empirical approach resurfaces.  These ‘contradictory opinions’ can be
divided into two camps: the Pythagorean (strictly mathematical), and the Aristoxenian (strictly
empirical).  Aristoxenus maintains that reason plays only a secondary role to the senses; it is the
senses that we rely on to determine the measure of intervals and what is or is not consonant.  The
Pythagoreans place the senses secondary to reason; although they concede that one may use
empirical data as a tool to judge truths , they claim that such data is fallible and can be misleading.33
Hence an interval that is seemingly sweet is rejected as dissonant if its mathematical ratio does not
comply with those ratios the Pythagoreans have classified as ‘consonant’.  34
Ptolemy came the closest to resolving the ongoing tension between mathematical ratios and
the musician’s ear.  However, if one were to place Ptolemy in one camp or the other, he would
definitely be considered a Pythagorean.  After all, Boethius devotes an entire chapter to Ptolemy in
order to justify his own claim that, while the senses play a fundamental role in music, reason is
music’s governing principle.  However, as Boethius puts it: “Ptolemy is quite critical of Aristoxenus
and the Pythagoreans ... for Aristoxenus does not trust reason at all but only the senses, while the
Pythagoreans are too little concerned with the senses and too much concerned with the ratios yielded
 Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, Book 5, Chapter 3 {355]. In Chapters 13-18,35
Boethius discusses Ptolemy’s criticism of both Aristoxenus and Archytas with regard to their division of the diapason
(octave) and the diatessaron (fourth).
 Ibid., Book Five, Chapters 11 and 12. Boethius discusses what he considers Ptolemy’s reply to the36
Pythagorean evaluation and classification of consonances to support his own position with regard to the mathematical
rationale implicit within intervals.  However, it should be noted that Boethius’ conflation of two separate chapters in
Ptolemy’s Harmonica somewhat compromises Ptolemy’s position; see Calvin Bower, trans., Boethius, Fundamentals
of Music, p. 170 (Footnote 31).
 This is reminiscent of Archytas; see Chapter 2 above in this thesis.37
 See Chapter 2  above in this thesis.38
  Note also Archytas in Chapter 2 abovein this thesis – Ptolemy merely accepted the ratio, while Archytas39
sought to justify it mathematically through arithmetic and harmonic means; see Andrew Barker, Harmonic and Acoustic
Theory, pp. 46-52.
-41-
by reason.”   According to Boethius, Ptolemy takes a far more broad-minded position espousing35
the virtues of both the senses and reason (with emphasis on reason), making the claim that intervals
sounding consonant do in fact have mathematical ratios that are consistent.  He agrees with the
Pythagoreans that the difference between high and low pitches is quantitative and that intervals can
be expressed mathematically, but his classification of intervals goes far beyond anything they would
have considered acceptable.   Ptolemy translates the ratios found in the Pythagorean system into36
the lowest numbered ratios that correspond to what the musician’s ear hears as consonant.
Consequently, his categories include ratios that the Pythagoreans would have rejected – but do
sound pleasing to the ear.   For instance, the Pythagorean translation of the interval of a ‘major37
third’ into a mathematical ratio (deciphered mathematically as the product of two tones ) is 81:64.38
Yet the musician would tune a consonant sounding third to the simpler ratio of 5:4 (or 80:64).39
Ptolemy did not reject this simpler ratio as imperfect because it was not arrived at in a purely
mathematical way; the ratio 5:4 sounds sweet to the ear. As far as Ptolemy was concerned, the more
simplex the ratio, the more consonant the interval.  Further, the mathematical ratios describing the
 See Boethius, Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, Book Five, Chapter 11.40
 Guido of Arezzo, an eleventh-century music theorist,  was obviously familiar with Boethius (he recounts the41
Pythagorean numerical ratios of the consonants).  Arezzo makes the claim, however, that Boethius’ treatise of music was
useful for philosophers, but not for singers.  He wrote his Micrologus around 1026 as a manual to train choirs, and is most
noted for implementing the ‘Guidonian solmization’ (ut, re, mi, fa, sol la) which helps singers recognize where the tones
and semitones appear in the scales they are singing.  His work was completely original for its time and fundamentally
practical; see Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,”  pp. 365-356. 
 Although much was written during the Middle Ages with regard to music theory, and change and progression42
in music for voice and instruments is apparent, it was, for the most part, over-shadowed by De institutione musica, and
the underlying system of scales and modes set out by Boethius was the methodological model used by Western scholars
well into the twelfth century.  For an overview of the progression of plainchant, and the emergence of polyphony (and
so forth) from Boethius through to the fifteenth century (accompanied by an impressive bibliography), see Claude V.
Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” pp. 362-370.
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musician’s tuning were as acceptable, perhaps even more acceptable, than the ratios arrived at
purely mathematically.  Consequently,  he has a much broader classification of musical intervals
that can be translated into consistent numerical ratios.    40
Ptolemy successfully concedes  the importance of physical perception, without jeopardizing
the claim that we arrive at an understanding of the laws that govern harmonic structure through
mathematical reasoning.  In other words, he did not neglect the why as Aristoxenus did.  This lends
support to Boethius’ own position.  Boethius understands the true musician as one who dwells on
the mathematical principles inherent within music, for it is mathematical reasoning that allows one
to make sense of the sweet sounds that are perceived by the ear.  Hence a reconciliation between
our ability to speculate (reason) and what is experienced (faith) has been accomplished.
Speculation, however, is that which brings one closer to truth.  This is why the main objective in his
treatise of music theory is to pursue philosophy,  rather than becoming an accomplished musician.41
Boethius’ work was the primary source of music theory for students during the Middle Ages
and was available in every monastic library.   Although Boethius faded into the shadows somewhat42
 See, for example, Johannes de Garlandia, De mensurabili musica ( ca. 1225); Franco of Cologne’s Ars cantus43
mensurabilis ( ca. 1250); the treatise of Anonymus 4 ( ca. 1270-1280); the treatise of the St.Emmeram Anonymus (1279);
Hieronymus de Moravia’s Tractatus de musica (1272); Walter Odington’s Summa de speculatione musice (early
fourteenth century); and Jacobus of Liège’s Speculum musice (ca. 1325).  For Latin editions of the respective treatises,
see Erich Reimer, ed. Johannes de Garlandia: De mensurabili musica – Kritische Edition mit Kommentar und
Interpretation der Notationslehre, 2 parts, Vol. 11 of Beihefte zum Archiv für Musikwissenschaft, ed. by Hans Heinrich
Eggebrecht et al. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972); Gilbert Reaney and Andre Gilles, eds., Franconis de Colonia: Ars
cantus mensurabilis, Vol. 18 of Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, ed. by Armen Carapetyan (American Institute of
Amusicology, 1974); Fritz Reckow, ed., Der Musiktraktat des Anonymous 4, 2 parts, Vol. 4 of Beihefte zum Archiv für
Musikwissenschaft, ed. by Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht et al. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967); Jeremy Yudkin, De musica
mensurata: The Anonymous of St. Emmeram – Complete Critical Edition, Translation and Commentary, part of Music:
Scholarship and Performance, ed. by Thomas Binkley (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1990); S. M. Cserba, ed., Hieronymus de Moravia O.P.: Tractatus de musica, Vol. 2 of Freiburger Studien zur
Musikwissenschaft (Regensburg, 1935); Frederick F. Hammond, ed., Walter Odington: Summa de speculatione musicae,
Vol. 14 of Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, ed. by Armen Carapetyan (American Institute of Musicology, 1970); Roger
Bragard, ed., Jacobi Leodiensis: Speculum musicae, Vol. 3 of  Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, ed. by Armen Carapetyan
(American Institute of Musicology, 1961).  For a good overview of thirteenth and fourteenth century musical scholarship,
see Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,”; Palisca further notes in this article that: “Reading the treatises of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries leads one to question how much of Boethius was studied or understood during those years of
swiftly changing musical practices or how relevant the book was considered”; see, ibid. p. 371.
 Claude V. Palisca, Girolamo Mei: Letters on Ancient and Modern Music, p.40; Claude V. Palisca, “Boethius44
in the Renaissance,” p. 259.
 Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” p. 92.45
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during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as contemporary scholars came to the forefront , with43
the Renaissance his work was once again in the spotlight and scholars were newly incited to search
for the texts and authors mentioned in his treatise.    Two opposite reactions ensued: an attempt to44
keep the consonances ‘pure’ in accordance with Pythagorean and Boethian ratios (musica theorica)
and an anti-theoretical movement that aspired towards a broader scope of ‘consonance’ that relied
solely on the musician’s ear (musica practica).
Up until the Renaissance, theoretical music occupied a prestigious place among the four
mathematical disciplines of the quadrivium, and remained separate and distinct from the world of
the practicing musician.    With the rebirth of Greek humanism, the early stages of the Renaissance45
 Ibid., p. 92.  This was aspired to by such music scholars and humanist patrons as Johannes Tinctoris,46
Franchinus Gaffurius, Girolamo Mei and Count Giovanni Bardi (who established the Florentine ‘Camerata”, an informal
gathering of noblemen and musicians who, in the Greek humanistic fashion, would discuss poetry, music and philosophy);
see Claude V. Palisca,  Girolamo Mei: Letters on Ancient and Modern Music, Chapters I to IV.
 Ibid. p. 93.47
 Sixteenth-century music theorist and composer, Gioseffo Zarlino was noted for his tenacious adherence to48
the Pythagorean tuning and classification of consonances, although in his treatise, Le istitutioni harmonich (1558), he
advocates the syntonic diatonic tuning of Ptolemy; see Gioseffo Zarlino, The Art of Counterpoint, trans. by Guy A. Marco
and Claude V. Palisca as part of Music Theory Translation Series, ed. by Claude V. Palisca (New Haven, Connecticut
and London: Yale University Press, 1976 is second printing of 1968), Part III of Le Istitutioni harmoniche (1558); Claude
V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” pp. 373-374.
 Vincenzo Galilei, a sixteenth-century Florentine and father of astronomer Galileo Galilei, was a theorist,49
lutenist, and student of Zarlino (and later became Zarlino’s severest critic); see Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,”
p. 120.  For an in depth and comprehensive discussion of Galilei and his works, see Claude V. Palisca, trans., Vincenzo
Galilei: Dialogue on Ancient and Modern Music, trans. with introduction and notes by Claude V. Palisca as part of the
Music Theory Translation Series, ed. by Claude V. Palisca (New Haven, Connecticut and London: Yale University Press,
2003).  For an interesting explication of Galilei and Kepler on Cosmology, see Owen Gingerich, “Kepler, Galilei, and the
Harmony of the World,” in: Music and Science in the Age of Galileo, ed. by Victor Coelho as Vol. 51 of The University
of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, ed. by Robert E. Butts (Dordrecht, Netherlands; Boston,
Massachusetts; and London: Kuwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 45-63. 
 Marin Mersenne (1588-1648) was a mathematician, philosopher and scientist.  He corresponded not only with50
Descartes, but with all the leading scientists of his day, including Pascal, Fermat and Hobbes.  His correspondences served
as a kind of network of information within the academic community in Europe.   In his writings he approaches music as
a scientific discipline, experimenting and measuring the physical properties of sound. His most complete treatise on music
was Harmonie universelle (Paris, France: S. Cramoisy, 1636-1637). For two examples of correspondences between
Mersenne and Descartes, see Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” p. 98 (Footnotes 17 and 18).
 René Descartes (1596-1650) was the “chief architect of the seventeenth century intellectual revolution which51
destabilized the traditional doctrines of Medieval and Renaissance scholasticism...”; see John Cottingham, The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy, ed. by Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 188.  His influence was
strongly felt in the moving trend of music toward subjectivism and aesthetics, as he firmly held that consonances and
tuning systems were reliant on the subjective ear of the musician.
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witnessed a brief synthesis of musica theorica and musica practica.  However, toward the end of46
the sixteenth century “...the quadrivium exploded from its inner stresses and expanding constituents
and the two disciplines, musical art and musical science, began to acquire their separate modern
identities.”   The scholars whose ongoing polemics best illustrate this contentious climate are47
Zarlino  and Galilei ,  and Mersenne  and Descartes . 48 49 50 51
Gioseffo Zarlino firmly held that music is a manifestation of numbers, and that it is only
 The octave, the perfect fifth and the perfect fourth.  Cristiano M.L. Forster, “Just Intonation,” as part of52
Musical Mathematics: Western Tuning Theory and Practice, Chapter 10, Part VI (2004), pp. 573-712. URL =
http://www.chrysalis-foundation.org./musical_mathematics.htm
 In other words, the major third and the minor sixth make up the perfect octave; for further reading on Zarlino’s53
inclusion of the minor sixth, see Alan C. Bowen, “The Minor Sixth (8:5) in Early Greek Harmonic Science,” in: American
Journal of Philology 99 (1978), pp. 501-506.
 Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” p.102.  Note also that Descartes devotes a chapter in his54
Compendium musicae to the major and minor thirds and sixths.  He places the major third ahead of the fourth (which he
called the ‘unhappiest of all consonances’) according to its degree of perfection; see René Descartes, Compendium of
Music, trans. by Walter Robert with introduction and notes by Charles Kent, Vol. 8 of Musicological Studies and
Documents, ed. by Armen Carapetyan,(American Institute of Musicology, 1961).
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through studying these ‘sounding’ numbers that one may understand the tones and ratios that
constitute what we understand to be music.  In his Institutioni harmoniche (1558) he proposed that
the numero senario (literally ‘number six’) constitutes all possible consonances within the musical
spectrum, and that the division of strings into simple ratios attests to the nature of harmony, and
produces all intervals that composers call ‘perfect’.    In monophony, such intervals as the major52
and minor thirds and sixths seldom arose, if at all; with the development of polyphony (through the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance) there arose a need to justify these intervals as consonances.  It
then became necessary to demonstrate that these intervals, which are produced by the ratios from
the first six numbers, are as sacred within the Pythagorean and Platonic framework as those ratios
produced from the first four numbers (2:1, 3:2, and 4:3).  Zarlino maintained that 6 is the first
perfect number (being the sum of all the whole numbers of which it is a multiple: 1+2+3=1x2x3=6)
and the augmented scope of ‘sacred’ consonances  must include the previously excluded major third
(5:4), minor third (6:5) and major sixth (5:3), with the minor sixth admitted contingently as the
inverse of the major third,  despite its ratio being outside the number six (8:5).    Zarlino was,53 54
consequently, the first Western music theorist to mathematically define what are now referred to
  Cristiano M.L Forster, Musical Mathematics: Western Tuning Theory and Practice, Chapter 10, Part VI,55
Section 41.
 It is important to note that all of Zarlino’s musical ratios are expressions of string length ratios, as were those56
music theorists who influenced him, most notably the Arabic scholars Al-Farabi (d. ca. 950) and Avicenna (980-1037).
Scientific experimentation was being done at the time of Zarlino which sought to undermine the premises of his theory,
but these experiments measured ratios with weights as opposed to length of string; see Cristiano M.L Forster, Musical
Mathematics: Western Tuning Theory and Practice, Part VI, Section 39; Dorothea Baumann, “Musical Acoustics in the
Middle Ages,” trans. by Barbara Haggh, in: Early Music 18/2 (May 1989), pp. 294-323; William Roy Bowen, “Music
and Number: An Introduction to Renaissance Harmonic Science,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Toronto, 1984). 
 See Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 373.57
 Claude V. Palisca writes “Mei typifies his generation also in wishing to lead music out of the sphere of58
mathematics and physics into that of poetics...There was more kinship, in his view, between the expressive arts of rhetoric,
poetry, oratory and music, than between music and mathematics or cosmology.” See Claude V. Palisca, trans., Girolamo
Mei: Letters on Ancient and Modern Music, p. 81.
 Giovanni Battista Benedetti (1530-1590) performed a number of experiments in an effort to shed light on the59
mechanics of the production of consonances.  He discovered that consonant intervals are a result of the compressions and
rarefactions of sound waves (see Footnote 61below in Chapter 3 of this thesis) in relation to lengths of string (provided
the tension remains constant); see Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” pp. 103-110.  These discoveries may have
undermined the importance of Zarlino’s senario, but they confirmed his claim that consonant intervals are a manifestation
of mathematical ratios.  Note also Mersenne’s experiments below in this chapter.
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as ‘minor keys’ and ‘major keys’.   55
Zarlino developed rules of composition based on the premise that intervals whose ratios are
derived from within the senario (the numbers one through six) have permanence and universality ;56
those derived outside of the senario are dissonant and impermanent, their sole purpose being that
of ornamentation to enhance the consonances.  His treatise on music theory and composition, the
Istitutioni harmoniche, is rife with theological overtones and became the authority in contrapuntal
writing for the next century and a half.  This is not to say, however, that there were no reputable
music theorists who criticized Zarlino.   During this time there was a strong movement in the music57
circles of Europe that moved away from a purely mathematical approach to music theory.   The58
premises upon which he bases his theory were undermined as early as the sixteenth century by a
number of scientific discoveries, the most notable performed by Giovanni Battista Benedetti  and59
 For a broad discussion of acoustic experiments performed in the Middle Ages, see Dorothea Baumann,60
“Musical Acoustics in the Middle Ages”;  William Roy Bowen, “Music and Number.”
 Compressions and rarefactions refer to the movement of molecules produced by the longitudinal wave of61
vibration (first introduced by Girolamo Fracastoro in his De sympathia et antipathia rerum (Venice, 1546) as addensatio
et rarefatio: two strings of equal length stretched to the same tension are susceptible to each other’s vibrations,
demonstrating that the movement of air around the vibrating strings is measurable).  When this longitudinal wave reaches
our eardrum, we hear sound.  When two longitudinal waves are occurring simultaneously, and their waves of vibration
are not in proportion with one another, then one hears noise, or dissonance.  At any frequency (number of vibrations per
second) other than a harmonic frequency, the resulting disturbance of the medium is irregular and non-repetitive.  Any
object (especially a musical instrument) that vibrates in a regular and repetitive fashion, contains harmonic frequencies
that are related to each other by simple whole number ratios.  The major distinction between music and noise is that noise
contains a hodgepodge of frequencies that have no mathematical connection, while music contains a blend of frequencies
that are mathematically relational.  The interval that one hears as consonant, therefore, is contingent upon the  relationship
of the longitudinal waves being mathematically commensurable.
 Benedetti, Diversarum speculationum mathematicarum & physicorum liber; as mentioned in Claude V.62
Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,”  p. 105. Concerning iconographical evidence with regard to the monochord divisions,
see, for example, Guido of Arezzo illustrating the division of the string length to Bishop Theobaldus, in his Micrologus
which he dedicated to Bishop Theobaldus, transmitted in twelfth-century manuscript, as preserved in Vienna,
Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek; see Donald J. Grout and Claude V. Palisca, A History of Western Music (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 2001 is sixth edition of 1960), p. 51.
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later, Vincenzo Galilei, a former student of Zarlino.
Zarlino’s weakness lies in his attributing consonance to specific numbers, and not specific
ratios.  Experiments in acoustics performed by the sixteenth century mathematician Benedetti
revealed that the distinction between consonance and dissonance has to do with the proportions
themselves, and not with the specific numbers that measure them.   For instance, we know that the60
ratio describing the consonant octave is 2:1.  Therefore, if one were to pluck the string of a
monochord, and then pluck one half of the length of the string, the molecules in the air that are
affected by the sound waves produced by these two different lengths would be moving
proportionally (2:1) with one another.  The sound produced would therefore be a consonant one, as
the series of compressions and rarefactions would not be clashing against each other.   “Therefore,61
since the longer part is twice the shorter, and they are both of the same tension, in the time that the
longer completes one period of vibration, the shorter completes two.”   The ratios describing62
 For instance, the minor sixth has a ratio of (8:5) which is outside of the senario. Even so,  Zarlino hears the63
interval as consonant and rationalizes it into his system. See p. 46 above in this chapter.
 Benedetti proved that if one adheres to the syntonic diatonic tuning of Ptolemy or the Pythagorean tuning,64
then it is impossible to sing polyphonically without the pitch falling.  If a theoretically true Pythagorean or Ptolemeic
tuning of the consonances is maintained,  as one ascends by fifths (multiplying by 3:2), the pitch at the point of departure
will be altered once the cycle of fifths (twelve intervals of the fifth, or seven octaves) is complete.  This discrepancy (the
difference between twelve fifths and seven octaves) is referred to as a Pythagorean comma (see Claude V. Palisca,
“Scientific Empiricism,” pp. 114-115; see also, Chapter 2, Footnote 94 above).  The only way the pitch can remain true
is in a well-tempered system, where the octave is divided into twelve equal half-tones.  This is why the natural tendency
for the musician is to adhere to a well-tempered tuning.
 See Claude V. Palisca, Studies in the History of Italian Music and Music Theory, pp. 200-235.65
 See Archytas above in Chapter 2 of this thesis.66
  See Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 373.  Theorists indoctrinated in Boethius’ Fundamentals of67
Music had difficulty with the half-tone. Aside from the difficulties explained in Footnote 64 above in Chapter 3 of this
thesis, the division of the octave into twelve equal semitones is based on the irrational number ‘root  2’.  The Pythagorean
whole tone (9:8) can only be divided into a lesser and a greater, but not two equal semitones.  In an equal tempered scale
(where the octave is divided into twelve equal semitones), the semitone is not a simple integer ratio, it is the twelfth root
of 2 and larger intervals are multiples of the twelfth root of two.  For further explication on the division of the whole tone,
and the problem of irrational numbers in Greek Music Theory, see Heinrich Vogt, “Die Entdeckungsgeschichte des
Irrationalen nach Plato und anderen Quellen des 4. Jahrhunderts,” in: Bibliotheca Mathematica 3/X (1909-1910), pp. 97-
155;  Jan W. Herlinger, “Marchetto’s Division of the Whole Tone,” in: Journal of the American Musicological Society
34 (1981), pp. 193-216; Jan W. Herlinger, “Fractional Division of the Whole Tone,” in: Music Theory Spectrum 3 (1981),
pp. 74-83.
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consonances understood as the ‘frequency of vibrations’ are not limited by Zarlino’s perfect number
6.   In fact, if one is to strictly adhere to the Pythagorean tuning system as Zarlino does, then63
difficulties arise in compositions – difficulties that can only be nullified with the musicians ear.64
Although ignored among the intellectuals who clung to Pythagorean ideology, Benedetti’s
experiments sparked interest in those more empirically-minded scholars, such as Vincenzo Galilei .65
It was already common practice for musicians to tune consonances to sound sweeter to the ear,  but,66
as Benedetti pointed out,  the unequal half-tones (or semitones) became more obvious in polyphonic
music.  Claude V. Palisca writes: 67
The two tunings that had received theoretical sanction up to now, the
Pythagorean...and the syntonic diatonic of Ptolemy... were both originally
devised for purely melodic music, such as that of a voice singing alone, or
 Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” p. 114; see also Footnotes 61 and 64 of Chapter 3 above in68
this thesis.
 See Nicola Vicentino (1511-ca.1576) who would not settle with abstract mathematical theory, and69
demonstrated how his theories applied to practical composition and tuning.  He is famous for his L’antica musica ridotta
alla moderna prattica (Ancient Music Restored to Modern Practice) first published in Rome in 1555; see Bill Alves, “Just
Intonation system of Nicola Vicentino,” in: Journal of the Just Intonation Network 5, no.2 (1989), pp. 8-13, URL =
http://www2.hmc.edu/~alvespubs.html.
 Galilei proposed a uniform semitone of 18:17 for instrumental music, but maintained that voices aspired70
toward a juster intonation than could not be defined (hence, root 2); see Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 373.
 See Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” pp. 114-115.71
 Discorso intorno all’ opere di messer Gioseffo Zarlino da Chioggia (Florence: G. Marescotti, 1589), pp. 92-72
93; see Claude Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” p. 122.      
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in unison with other voices or instruments.  When either of these tunings was
used in polyphonic music, many difficulties arose because of their unequal
tones or semitones, or their harsh sounding consonances on certain steps of
the scale.  From earliest times instrument builders and tuners compensated
for these shortcomings by tempering the consonances by ear.  68
Consequently, the problem of tuning became the subject of much debate among music theorists.69
One of the earliest advocates of the empirical approach to music was Vincenzo Galilei.  He
developed a new ranking system of consonances based solely on sense experience and was
convinced that equal temperament was the only solution for instrumental music.   Zarlino’s70
objection to equal temperament  arose from his purely theoretical and rational classification of71
consonances, and his unwillingness to accept any consonances outside of the senario. In response,
Galilei claims that: “among the musical intervals, those contained outside the senario are as natural
as those within it.  The third contained in the 81:64 ratio is as natural as that in the 5:4 ratio.  For the
seventh to be dissonant in the 9:5 ratio is as natural as for the octave to be consonant in the 2:1
ratio.”    Galilei refused to accept that there was any ‘universal harmonia’ in nature and strongly72
advocated equal temperament, thereby dismissing both the Pythagorean diatonic and Ptolemy’s
 Ptolemy’s syntonic diatonic falls somewhere in between equal temperament and the Pythagorean tuning; see73
Andrew Barker, “Ptolemy on the Harmonic Division of His Predecessors,” in: Andrew Barker, Scientific Method in
Ptolemy’s Harmonics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.109-131; Andrew Barker,
“Reason and Perception,” in: Scientific Method in Ptolemy’s Harmonics, pp. 14-32; Jon Solomon , “A Preliminary
Analysis of the Organization of Ptolemy’s Harmonics,” in: Music Theory and Its Sources: Antiquity and the Middle Ages,
Vol. 1 of Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies, ed. by André Barbera  (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990), pp. 68-84.
 Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,”  p. 122.74
 Galilei was highly influenced by Florentine humanist, Girolamo Mei (1519-1594).  Among other things, Mei75
was noted for distinguishing between music as science and music as art: he felt that dissecting art in terms of its scientific
and metaphysical facts was a violation of its intrinsic subjective nature.  For insight into Mei’s correspondence with Galilei,
a good source is Claude Palisca, Girolamo Mei: Letters on Ancient and Modern Music.
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syntonic diatonic.  According to Galilei, reason is not the governing factor in creating the perfect73
tuning system – it is the musician’s ear that will hear whether or not an interval is consonant or
dissonant.  He does not, however, entirely dismiss the notion of a correlation between what one
hears as consonance and consistent numerical ratios –  after all, he was musically trained within a
Boethian context – but he considers these numerical ratios as units of measurement (measuring
sounding bodies) and nothing more.  His argument is an illustration of music theorists’ move toward
an exclusively subjective approach to music, for he holds that “the musician deals in a subjective
realm in which the sense has sufficient powers unaided by the reason.”   74
Like Aristoxenus (who was neglected for the most part until now as the nemesis of
Boethius), Galilei’s aim was to create a musical system based on data compiled from sense
experience and observation.  Unlike Zarlino, Galilei was not interested in trying to fit musical facts
into a purely rational and theoretical system.    His experiments were quite revelatory.  For instance,75
he discovered that the octave may be brought about by three different ratios: in accordance with
string length the ratio is 2:1 (which corresponds with linear measurement); with weights attached
to strings (changing the tension in the strings) the ratio is 4:1 (analogous to surface measurements
 As was mentioned above, Zarlino’s error lies in his accepting only those ratios that are found within his76
senario.  The mathematical ratios remain consistent, but they are not limited to the number 6. 
 Galilei’s experiments indirectly support Plato’s argument discussed in Chapter 2 above in this thesis: we cannot77
acquire perfect consonance in an imperfect world.
 These experiments are elegantly shown in the woodcut included in Franchino Gaffurio’s Theorica musice,78
Book 1, Chapter 8; as reproduced in: Gaetano Cesari, ed., Facsimile Edition of Franchino Gaffurio: Theorica musice
(Rome, 1934); see also Franchino Gaffurio, The Theory of Music, trans. by Walter K. Kreyszig, p. 48 (Figure 1.8.1).
 Once again, this argument lends support to Plato’s position – the rougher the instrument, the farther it is from79
sounding a pure consonant; it is the shape and material of an instrument that will determine how truly the consonant
interval can be sounded. An oboe, for instance, will sound a much purer pitch than a blade of grass between one’s thumbs.
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2²); and with volume of concave bodies like organ pipes the ratio is 8:1 (corresponding to cubic
measurements 2³).  He also discovered that, in testing strings of various materials, a unison was76
only possible if the thickness, length, material and tension were identical.   Alter any one of these77
factors and a unison cannot occur.  According to Galilei, these experiments reveal the confusion
suffered by Zarlino and those theorists before him : the legendary ‘sounding’ numbers that are78
allegedly manifest in music have no actual existence – they are only significant insofar as they
measure material relationships in ‘sounding’ bodies.  They are meaningless in and of themselves.
Furthermore, one cannot rely on mathematics to judge the superiority of one tuning system over
another.  According to Galilei, a consonant interval that manifests an acceptable ratio may sound
sweet on one instrument, yet edgy on another, depending on the material and shape of the
instrument.   The ear judges by listening, not quantifying.79
Similarly, in a letter to Marin Mersenne dated January 13, 1634, Descartes writes : 
Concerning the sweetness of consonance, there are two things to be distinguished,
that is, what makes them simpler and more concordant and what makes them more
pleasing to the ear.  Now, as for what renders them more pleasing, this depends on
the places where they are employed, and there are places where even the diminished
fifths and other dissonances are more pleasing than the consonances, so it is not
possible to determine absolutely that one consonance is more pleasing than
 Marin Mersenne, Correspondance, II, as cited in Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,”  pp. 111-112.80
In response to Descartes, I answer that placement is crucial – for the only manner in which a dissonance sounds ‘more
pleasing than the consonances’ is in its resolution to a consonant interval.  A  composer will utilize the jarring sound of
the dissonance to make the consonance even more gratifying. 
 See Anthony Kenny, Descartes: Philosophical Letters. 81
 For a good overview and bibliography of Marin Mersenne, see Albert Cohen, “Marin Mersenne” in: The New82
Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 29 vols., ed. by Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell, (London: Macmillan,
2001),Vol. 16, pp. 468-470.
 See Footnote 61 of Chapter 3 in this thesis.83
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another.  80
Descartes makes a distinction here that is seminal in his position, namely between that which is
‘simpler’ or ‘most perfect’ and that which is ‘most pleasing’.  His ranking of consonances became
the subject of an ongoing debate between himself and Mersenne.   Mersenne also conducted81
painstaking experiments, studying the acoustics of vibrating strings and organ pipes, and measuring
waves and the speed of sound; he counted music among those disciplines that can be analyzed and
rationally explained, and wrote about these scientific pursuits in such works as Quaestiones
celeberrimae in Genesim (Paris,1623) and especially the Harmonie universelle (Paris, 1636-7).82
As a result of these experiments (and those performed by Benedetti and Galilei) Mersenne
concluded that the relative ‘pleasingness’ of consonances was caused by the concurrence of the
returns of vibrations.  As mentioned above , the frequencies measured in consonant intervals adhere83
to a consistent pattern and mathematical relationship.  Mersenne’s experiments in acoustics revealed
that the purer an interval sounds, the simpler the numerical ratio is that governs it; the more
unpleasant an interval sounds, the more complex the numerical ratio is – and the more erratic its
wave pattern.
Descartes did not accept this argument’s claim as a thorough enough explanation as to why
 Charles Kent writes: “The similarity between many of Descartes’ remarks and those of Zarlino in his Le84
institutioni harmoniche (1558) and the fact that Descartes, in the Compendium, admits having read the work indicate that
Descartes was indebted to Zarlino for many of his theories”;  Charles Kent in René Descartes, Compendium of  Music,
trans. by Walter Robert, p. 9.
 See René Descartes, “ The Steps or Musical Tones,” in: Compenium of Music, trans. by Walter Robert, pp.85
28-43.
 The work was, after all, written specifically for Isaac Beeckman (1558-1637), a well-known mathematician.86
It was Beeckman who had shown Descartes a demonstration of the correspondence between the wave motions of
consonances; see Footnote 61 of Chapter 3 above in this thesis.
  Note the chapter devoted to ‘About Composition and the Modes’ where he provides his reader with basic87
rules of composition, most of which still holds today, especially in choral writing; see René Descartes, Compenium of
Music, trans. by Walter Robert, pp. 46-51.
 Ibid. p. 45.88
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certain intervals sound pleasing to the listener’s ear while others do not.  In his Compendium
musicae (1618), written in his youth,  he does recognize a hierarchy of consonances when reduced
to their mathematical ratios and he remains true to Zarlino’s senario,  for at the time he was84
immersed in an environment that was inundated with the ideals of Greek humanism.  His systematic
presentation of consonant and dissonant intervals, and the lengthy chapter devoted to ‘the steps or
musical tones’ , reveal music’s innate mathematical nature   –  but his primary focus is how these85 86
intervals are arranged to create the most pleasing sound.   One may classify the intervals in a87
system that adheres to a scale of simplicity; yet once they are applied to the practical art of music,
the most perfect interval may sound the least pleasing.  He writes that dissonances borrow sweetness
from neighboring consonances and that “consonances are not, as a matter of fact, so absolute that
all their sweetness will be lost if one pitch of the interval is moved a very little.”   Descartes’88
distinction between ‘simplicity’ and ‘pleasingness’ paved the way for a separation of the objective
(musica theorica) and the subjective (musica practica) in music, and set the stage for music’s
eventual push into the realm of aesthetics.  This new trend in music and composition focused
 As evinced by surviving treatises, such as  Franchino Gaffurio, Musica practica (1492); Claudio Monteverdi,89
Quinto libro de madrigali (1605); Giulio Cesare Monteverdi, Scherzi musicali (1607); and Girolamo Diruta, Seconda
parte del Transilvano (1609); see Claude V. Palisca, “Theory, theorists,” p. 374-376.
 See, for example, Johann Mattheson; Eduard Hanslick; and Peter Kivy to name a very few. 90
 Boethius relays in Book I, Chapter 10 of The Fundamentals of Music, trans. by Calvin Bower, the story of91
Pythagoras and the smithy: “In the meantime, by a kind of divine will, while passing the workshop of blacksmiths, he
overheard the beating of hammers somehow emit a single consonance from differing sounds.  Thus in the presence of what
he had long sought, he approached the activity spellbound.  Reflecting for a time, he decided that the strength of the men
hammering caused the diversity of sounds, and in order to prove this more clearly, he commanded them to exchange
hammers among themselves.  But the property of sounds did not rest in the muscles of the men; rather, it followed the
exchanged hammers.  When he had observed this, he examined the weight of the hammers.  There happened to be five
hammers, and those which sounded together the consonance of the diapason (8ve) were found to be double in weight...”
For further commentary on this myth, see Marius Schneider, “Pythagoras in der Schmiede,” in: Festgabe zum 60.
Geburtstag von Willi Kahl am 18. Juli 1953. (Cologne, 1953), pp. 126-129; on the relevance of myth as a historical
phenomena, Peter G. Bietenholz writes: “Fact and fiction – all history must include both; all that is not fact, indeed, all
interpretation of the facts, must ultimately fall within the reach of fabula”; Peter G. Bietenholz, Historia and Fabula:
Myths and Legends in Historical Thought from Antiquity to the Modern Age, Vol. 59 of Brill’s Studies in Intellectual
History,ed. by A.J. Vanderjagt et al. (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1994), p. 1. 
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primarily on musica practica , expounding the virtues of improvisation, and liberally utilizing89
dissonances.  Consequently the reign of Boethius’ musica theorica that had prevailed for so many
centuries and kept music in its place as one of the cornerstones of the quadrivium, was coming to
an end.  Music had been redefined and was now classified as a branch of aesthetics, not
mathematics.  By the end of the Renaissance, subjectivism became the normative approach . 90
Especially since the romantic movement in the nineteenth century, music is understood as
a means of communicating expression and emotion.  Does this in any way undermine the results of
experiments performed by Mersenne and others before and after him?  Absolutely not.  Sound must
bow down to the laws of physics, and physics must bow down to the objectivity and universality of
mathematics; the purest consonances sound that way because the frequencies of the vibrating strings
(or organ pipes, or bells, or a blacksmith’s hammers ) adhere to unchanging numerical ratios.  Such91
evidence is irrefutable, and one can make the claim that:  insofar as music contains consistent
mathematical truths, and mathematical truths are objective and eternal, music necessarily contains
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objective truths that are eternal. Further, the properties of music that are discussed within the
context of aesthetics – its expression, its meaning, its very composition – are temporal, corruptible
and subject to change.  Such dynamic and ever changing properties are contingent upon the eternal
and unchanging properties that are woven to create music’s very fabric.  The relationship between
the eternal and the temporal in music, the musica theorica and the musica practica,  is not a
mutually exclusive one.  The relationship is one of contingency – the latter upon the former.
 As Robert Walker writes: “In musical perception...when we hear a consonance, we hear it for cultural reasons,1
not physical ones.  Musical perception is, therefore, a matter of habituation and acculturation... On the one hand, music
is man’s creation (its laws, its values, its forms); on the other, however, it reflects certain empirically verifiable behaviors
of vibrating strings, columns of air etc.  The two can only be reconciled through an understanding of man’s proclivity to
select for his own purposes and reasons certain vibrations rather than others.  His selection is based upon cultural values
rather than values attached to universal properties which would tend to attract the ‘thinking’, logical mind”; Robert
Walker, “Music Perception and the Influence of Western Musical Theory,” in: Canadian Journal of Research in Music
Education 29 (Aug. 1987), p. 54.
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Chapter 4
A Shift from Musica theorica to Musica practica:
Some Contemporary Arguments in Philosophy of Music
     Unlike his fellow scientist Mersenne, who felt that music’s ability to sway the emotions was
scientifically explicable,  Descartes considered music’s emotive effect on the ‘heart’ of the listener
scientifically immeasurable.  Descartes’ claim reflects a shift in focus from the music itself (with
its eternal properties) to the subject experiencing it.  This position represents the dominant approach
to music today, which is why, as a general rule,  the listener is at the center of most philosophical
discussions of music.   As the focus is on the listener, or the subject experiencing the music, then1
such discussions are necessarily concerned with music’s temporal, changing and subjective
properties, as opposed to its eternal, unchanging and objective properties.  As a general rule, music
in contemporary thought is understood in terms of its expression of emotion,  meaning,  imagery and
colour and how such expression is received by its listener, and not in terms of its mathematical
constituents. Yet how can music’s expressive nature – and the recipient of such expression –  remain
separate from its eternal constituents, and the principle of D:@<\"?  Harmonia comprises the very
fabric of music and with it its immutable mathematical truths.  One can only experience music from
within a temporal framework; yet during that brief period of time, can it not be said that one is
partaking in music’s eternal nature? 
 Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca, New York and2
London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 146.
 Ibid., p. 146.3
The only context where the listener can recognize, without a doubt, the emotion that the composer is trying4
to convey  is that of opera, where the listener is following a libretto while watching the story unfold both audibly and
visually.
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To answer this question, one must first explore the implications of ‘emotion’ and ‘meaning’
in music.  This chapter will observe some contemporary perspectives that are concerned for the most
part with the subject experiencing music.  To begin, we turn our attention to two opposing positions
– that of the cognitivist, and that of the emotivist, labels borrowed from Peter Kivy.   In his book2
Music Alone, Kivy refers to these two positions as “an ancient quarrel that runs through the
philosophy of music [concerning] the relation of music to the emotive life...”   Both positions3
attempt to provide sound explanations pertaining to the so-called  immeasurable component of
music, namely, its ability to express emotion and meaning.  The musical cognitivist will  make the
claim that any emotion attributed to music exists as a property of the music itself and is merely
recognized by the listener. The musical emotivist will make the claim that any emotion attributed
to music exists only insofar as it is aroused in the listener.  Both claims raise some obvious
problems. 
The cognitivist holds that specific emotions are deliberately written into the very fabric of
a composition, and are therefore inherent within the music itself.  If this is possible, then the listener
should be able to recognize a particular emotion as a property of the music, not because the music
arouses that particular emotion in the listener.   The cognitivist will claim that since specific4
emotions are properties of the music itself, then emotions communicated by the composer should
be undeniably recognized by the listener.  It may be true that a composer can manipulate tonal-
 The following is one of seven “more or less plausible” propositions regarding music and emotion offered by5
Francis Sparshott: “some musical pieces are typically and properly heard as actually having the quality of a named emotion
(actually being mournful), in the sense that the name of the emotion in question will in suitable circumstances be not
merely accepted but volunteered as truly descriptive of it”; Francis Sparshott,” Music and Feeling,” in: Musical Worlds,
ed. by Philip Alperson (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), p. 27.
 Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful In Music (New York: Da Capo Press, 1974 is reprint of London and New6
York: Novello, 1891), p. 20.
 Johann Mattheson, Der vollkommene Capellmeister, Das ist Kapellmeister, das ist gründliche Anzeige aller7
derjenigen Sachen, die einer wissen, könnrn, und vollkommen inne haben muß,der einer Kapelle mit Ehren und Nutzen
vorshehen will: Zum Versuch entworffen (Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1739), Facsimile Reprint, ed. by Margarete
Reimann as Vol. 5 of Documenta Musicologica – Erste Reihe: druckschriften-Faksimiles, ed. by Association
Internationale des Bibliothèques Musicales and Internationale Gesellschaft für Musikwissenschaft (Kassel and Basel:
Bärenreiter, 1954); also in English translation, Ernest C. Harriss, Johann Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister:
A Revised Translation with Critical Commentary, Vol. 21 of Studies in Musicology, ed. by George Buelow (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: UMI Research Press, 1981).
 Ernest C. Harriss, Johann Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister, p. 104 (I, iii, 54) as cited in Peter8
Kivy, Music Alone, pp. 154.
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rhythmic patterns to represent certain emotions (a minor key is thought to be sad, or a fast
rhythmical pattern is considered exciting), but it is farfetched to assume that the composer can
determine, without a doubt, the emotional response that will be aroused within the listener.
The musical cognitivist, however, will turn attention away from the emotions aroused within
the listener, and towards the representation of emotions within the music itself.   The cognitivist
firmly holds that there are recognizable tonal and rhythmic patterns that can be used to represent
specific emotions.    Music’s aim is “above all, [to] produce something beautiful which affects not5
our feelings, but the organ of pure contemplation, our imagination.”   This is not to say that music6
does not move the listener – the cognitivist will make the distinction between the specific emotions
that the composer is expressing with deliberate tonal-rhythmic patterns, and how the listener reacts,
or is moved by those emotions.  
To illustrate this distinction, Kivy cites Johann Mattheson’s famous Der vollkommene
Capellmeister (1739) : “it is in the true nature of music that it is above all a teacher of propriety.”7 8
 For a summary of the rhetorical principle in music theoretical treatises in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,9
see Joseph Smits van Waesberghe, “Die Anwendung der ars rhetorica in den musiktheoretischen Traktaten des
Mittelalters und der Renaissance,” trans. by M.U. Schouten-Glass in: Dia-pason de monibus – Ausgewählte Aufsätze von
Joseph Smits van Waesberghe: Festgabe zu seinem 75. Geburtstag, ed. by C.J. Maas and M.U. Schouten-Glass (Buren:
Frits Knuf, 1976), pp. 71-90; for further reading on the link between music and grammar, see Mathias Bielitz, Musik und
Grammatik – Studien zur mittelalterlichen Musiktheorie, ed. by Reinhold Hammerstein et al. (Munich and Salzburg:
Musikverlag Emil Katzbichler, 1977).  For further explication on music and rhetoric since Greek Antiquity, see Paul
Lehmann, “Die Inst. Orat. Des Quintilianus im Mittelalter,” in: Philologus 89 (1934), pp. 349-383.
 Peter Kivy, Music Alone, p. 154.10
 Movie scores are a perfect example of this.  The purpose of a movie score is to convey specific, recognizable11
emotions in order to emotionally manipulate the audience; for an example of this, listen to any score written by John
Williams of Star Wars and E.T. fame.
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Mattheson firmly holds that a piece of music can be written with specific emotional properties. Such
properties have the power to move – and ultimately manipulate – the listener.  In keeping with the
prominence of rhetoric within the education system of eighteenth-century Germany,  Mattheson
espouses the virtues of music as a kind of rhetoric .  His compendium of practical and theoretical9
music (written specifically for the Lutheran church musician) devotes a great deal of attention to
the methodology involved in representing specific emotions within the music itself. With the help
of Mattheson’s compendium, the composer can supposedly convey particular emotions, and
through recognition of these emotions, the listener is moved to humbly expound upon the virtues
of God (or be reduced to contrition).  Put simply, Mattheson’s compendium is an attempt to provide
tools for writing powerful musical sermons.    10
Mattheson’s treatise on music draws the aforementioned distinction between the deliberate
and presumably recognizable ‘emotion’ that is woven into a composition, and the emotion felt by
the listener as she is moved by the composition.   As a ‘musical cognitivist’, Mattheson is not11
arguing that a composer has the ability to evoke emotion x in the listener; he is arguing that the
composer has the ability to include emotion x as a recognizable property of the written and
 Harold E. Fiske, Music and Mind: Philosophical Essays on the Cognition and Meaning of  Music (Lewiston,12
New York and Queenston, Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), pp. 105-129.
 Ibid., p. 108.13
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performed score.  His conviction, however,  that emotions written into a musical composition have
the ability to sway the listener into a life of Christian morality is unrealistic in two ways. First,  there
is no guarantee that through recognizing emotion x the listener will be moved in the appropriate way
– perhaps a musical depiction of Christ being crucified will evoke fear or revulsion instead of
sympathy or contrition.  Second, and this applies to the cognitivist position in general, there is no
weight to the claim that emotions can be ‘written into’ a score – a fast rhythmical pattern could be
associated with anything from excitement, to giddiness, to the ridiculous.  There is no guarantee that
specific tonal-rhythmic patterns represent specific emotions that every listener will  recognize.  The
listener brings too much of him or herself into the musical experience, and will recognize emotions
according to what is familiar.
It would seem natural, therefore,  to lean towards the emotivist position; the emotivist  will
label a piece of music ‘sad’ or ‘inspiring’ because that is the particular emotion the music elicits
in the average listener.  In a counterfactual manner, Harold E. Fiske, in his essay Why Music is Not
a Theory of Emotion,  adopts the position that the most common problem in theories of musical12
aesthetics is the “music-is-about-something-idea”.  He does not endorse the cognitivist’s notion that
music is a communication-specific system; a composer cannot communicate a specific emotion in
a composition no matter how inspirational the emotion was at the time the piece was being
composed.  Fiske writes: “It is the profusion-of-observed-responses problem that has created much
of the confusion and difficulty in developing theories that work as convincing descriptions of the
listener-music relationship and listener-response activity...”   In other words, there are potentially13
 Jean-Jacques Nattiez is discussed in more detail below in this chapter. 14
 Harold E. Fiske, Music and Mind, p. 129.15
 Another proposition offer by Francis Sparshott holds that: “the affective quality of some music is such that16
if a competent hearer is asked to apply to it one of two contrasted mood words or feeling words...the hearer will easily
be able to comply and the responses of hearers tend to be significantly in agreement...the competence required involves
not only relevant musical accomplishment but familiarity with the vocabulary used and its associated cultural codes.”
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multifarious responses to one piece of music, even though the composer may have intended only
one.  
Jean-Jacques Nattiez’s definition of  ‘meaning’ does well to illustrate Fiske’s argument:  “An
object of any kind takes on meaning for an individual apprehending that object, as soon as that
individual places the object in relation to areas of his lived experience – that is, in relation to a
collection of other objects that belong to his or her experience of the world.”   This definition can14
serve to shed light on the reasons why one particular piece of music inspires a ‘profusion-of-
responses’: the emotion that a piece of music evokes in a particular listener is dependent on the
listener’s numerous experiences and the specific emotions that each experience triggers. Fiske
writes that: “appearance-value is created by the listener in which an affect, based upon the listener’s
own life experiences, finds ground with particular musical patterns.”   The composer, therefore,15
could deliberately utilize specific ‘musical patterns’ to express a specific emotion, but this does not
necessarily incorporate a specific – and universally recognized – emotion directly into the fabric of
the piece.  The emotive qualities that a listener will attribute to a piece of music will depend upon
the listener’s vast repertoire of memories, either conscious or unconscious.  Fiske concedes that it
is possible for an indefinite number of listeners to respond in kind to a particular piece of music
(after all, culturally we are conditioned to a certain degree, and many life experiences are obviously
shared by most of us ); however, according to Fiske, it is impossible to make the claim that a16
Francis Sparshott, “Music and Feeling,” p. 27.
 Francis Sparshott, “Music and Feeling,” p. 23.  17
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composer has the ability to utilize specific tonal and rhythmic patterns in order to communicate a
specific emotion, and that every listener will recognize those patterns and, consequently, hear (and
possibly experience) that emotion. 
As far as Fiske is concerned, the musical cognitivist’s claim that emotions are properties of
the music is an absurd one.  Yet, the emotivist position finds its failing in the assumption that all
of music’s emotive qualities are contingent upon the listener’s experiencing specific emotions.   A
musical experience does not necessarily entail an emotional experience.  One may hear specific
things while partaking in a piece of music without deliberating on it, and, further, if the listener is
merely caught up in the beauty of a particular piece of music and not specific emotions, it is absurd
to make the claim that the experience, and the music, is devoid of emotion.   Further, the emotivist
is wrong to define music by means of diverse emotions aroused in such a broad range of listeners.
 Disagreement is inevitable.
The question remains – what is it that connects music and our emotions?  There are
numerous contemporary theories that attempt to provide reasons, but, as Francis Sparshott
pronounces in his essay Music and Feeling: 
There is much to say on the general theme of emotion and music; much that is of
great value has already been said...But none of it amounts to anything that could be
usefully called a theory of the relation between music and the emotions.  We do not
know what such a theory should be and have no reason to seek such
knowledge...granted the intimate relation between musical practice and the affective
side of life, there seems no reason a priori to suppose that only one relationship
should hold between musically formal structures and the active and affective lives
they relate to, or that they should relate distinctively to any specific range of such
phenomena, or  that such relationships as obtain should be reducible to any system.17
 Ibid., p. 27.18
 Nattiez prefers semiology over semiotics, as the former embraces a much broader range of potential meanings19
with its dialectical process.  Semiotics, on the other hand,  is a branch of linguistics that concerns itself specifically with
the signifier-signified relationship of language.  Such a system is stable, invariant, and scientifically explicable. Music,
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He observes that the objects of experience are “experienced as multifariously affectful, and music
as much as any.”   There is no denying that there are emotions that one experiences (or observes),18
while listening to the object that is the musical composition.  However, attempting to explain in a
single theory why particular emotions are aroused within particular individuals while experiencing
particular pieces of music is futile, and overwhelming. One may argue that a purely empirical theory
may be possible, where specific musical phrases are correlated with specific felt emotions.  This can
only occur, however, in mediums that are multi-sensory such as opera, theatre or film. In these
cases, the listener has something visual to reinforce any correlation between specific musical themes
and particular emotions.  For instance, while a character is mourning lost love,  the orchestra may
play a discordant and disturbing musical phrase, or perhaps a sad and pitiful one, or maybe even a
melody that is sweet and melancholy – whichever  musical theme is sounding will be the one that
the entire audience associates with that character’s loss.  Yet the discussion at hand is not about to
branch into other such mediums, for then music would be understood only secondarily (that is, as
a mere tool used to enhance a visual performance) and the question that asks whether or not there
can be a theory explaining the correlation between music (in and of itself) and emotions will remain
unanswered.  We must focus on the problem at hand, which seeks an explanation regarding the
multifarious emotional responses to a single piece of music.    
Remaining within the temporal camp, we turn our attention to Jean-Jacques Nattiez, whose
 general theory of musical semiology  attempts to provide such an explanation.  In his attempt to19
according to Nattiez, does not convey meaning in so closed a system. See the introduction to Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music
and Discourse, pp. 3-37.
 A term Nattiez uses often in Music and Discourse.20
 Wayne D. Bowman on Jean-Jacques Nattiez, as cited in: Wayne D. Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives of21
Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 201.
 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse, p. x.  From nineteen sixty-eight to nineteen-seventy, Jean-Jacques22
Nattiez studied semiology under Jean Molino at Aix-en-Provence.  For a brief biography of Jean-Jacques Nattiez, see
Jonathan Dunsby, “Jean-Jacques Nattiez,” in: New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 29 vols., ed. by Stanley
Sadie and John Tyrrell (London: Macmillan, 2001), Vol. 17, pp. 707-708.
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extrapolate meaning from the musical experience, Nattiez determined that there can be no simple
theory explaining the causal connection between the object that is the musical composition and the
subject experiencing it; the musical experience is an ongoing dialectic involving creativity, creation
and interpretation.  Although he concedes that there is some kind of “total musical fact”20
somewhere out there, we can only partially grasp it as it is ever-changing and continuously re-
experienced.
Nattiez understands meaning in music as “constituted by an open-ended interpretive process
constrained only by sounds and the lived experiences of those engaged with them...its meanings are
relative to a potentially infinite range of interpretive variables.”   In other words, it is not a simple21
matter of perceiving music as a form of communication with fixed signifiers that indicate particular
meanings for the listener.  What is occurring is more of a dynamic and perpetual dialectic.  His
‘tripartitional’ model of referring (adopted from Jean Molino ) involves the poietic, the immanent22
and the esthesic.  The poietic is the creative force that motivates the creation of an object (a piece
of music for example), which is what inspires the bringing about of an idea into an empirical form.
Unlike the cognitivist’s claim that meaning and emotion are objective properties of a composition
that reveal the composer’s intentions, Nattiez holds that the object created (the immanent) can only
 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse,. p. 166.23
 Ibid. p. x.24
 Ibid. pp. 5-6.25
 Ibid. p. 29.26
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infer the poietic process and the intention of the creator. This is where the interpretive (or esthesic)
process comes in, and such a process is flexible enough to accommodate the “entire lived
experience” of participants.   The ‘total musical fact’ lies at the very core of the process, but is23
inaccessible in and of itself.
This semiological process leaves behind the created musical object – and the creator of that
musical object – early on.  Any meaning or emotions that may be attached to it is left completely
in the hands of the listener and an ongoing interpretive process.  This  “tripartitional conception of
semiology as applied to ‘thinking about music’”  draws its dialectical format from the writings of24
Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914) , who presents an open, infinite system of the signifier-25
signified-interpretant relationship in an attempt to understand the meanings that signs generate.
Meaning, in such a system, is never exhausted, as there is an infinite web of interpretants for any
sign.  One begins with the signifier, and that which is signified.  The two are mediated by an
interpretant, which in turn, becomes the signifier, which is mediated by an interpretant, which in its
turn becomes the signifier, and so on ad infinitum.  Similarly, Nattiez claims that “the poietic lurks
under the surface of the immanent [and] the immanent is the spring-board for the esthesic” , with26
the poietic and the immanent being mediated by the esthesic, which then in turn becomes the
poietic, which is again mediated by new esthesic and so on. “Analysis never stops engineering a
 Ibid. p. 32.27
 Ibid. p. 7.28
 Ibid. p. 11.29
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dialectical oscillation among the three dimensions of the object”.   The material object remains27
neutral and  Nattiez goes so far as to conclude that “the object of the sign is actually a virtual object,
that does not exist except within and through the infinite multiplicity of interpretants, by means of
which the person using the sign seeks to allude to the object.”   There are multiple modes of28
potential interaction among the poietic, the immanent, and the esthesic levels, and numerous
perspectives to which any given sign may refer.  Focus has shifted from the musical object itself to
an infinite myriad of interpretants (or esthetic processes).  Music’s very definition, therefore, and
any meaning that music might convey, is utterly reliant upon the experience and social and cultural
context of the listener, for “it is never guaranteed that the webs of interpretants will be the same for
each and every person involved in the process.”    Nattiez leaves us with an understanding of the29
musical object (or the eternal and unchanging “total musical fact”) as something that is inaccessible,
and that meaning and expression in music can never be explicitly pinpointed for it exists as a
continuous dynamic and open-ended process with an unlimited ceiling (which, of course, remains
temporal and ever changing).
The nominalistic views of Nelson Goodman would not concede to there being any “total
musical fact”.  According to Goodman, there is no way the world actually ‘is’, only different ways
the world may be understood, or made to make sense.  Symbols (and any given system of symbols)
have no objective reference. Even though by definition they are referential, they do not refer to any
specific objective reality; they are merely cognitive tools that we employ to construct reality.
 See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1978).30
 Wayne D. Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives of Music, p. 225.31
.Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett32
Publishing, 1976), p. 43.
 Ibid., p. 43.33
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Goodman does not place music’s value in any kind of  capacity that provides insight into ‘ultimate’
reality, sentient or transcendent.  Like all symbolic activity, music is an act of ‘world-making’.  30
Goodman flatly rejects notions like essences and universals and looks upon human ‘reality’ as a
human construction.   Music’s primary function, therefore,  is not its ability to transcend the listener,
or reveal any ‘truths’.  Its primary function, like all symbol systems, is reality construction.
Wayne D. Bowman writes of Goodman, that he: “rejects the idea of one largely
undifferentiated, generic symbolic process in favour of an intricate and highly nuanced system of
symbolic modes: each distinctive in logical structure, and each making its unique contribution to
the essential symbolic mission of creating reality, of making worlds.”   Symbols are most often31
thought of as a representation of ‘reality’, and consequently representation is considered to be
almost a physical process like mirroring.  Goodman’s understanding of representation moves away
from such “perverted ideas” ;  symbol systems according to Goodman, could never ‘mirror’ reality.32
As mentioned above, there can only be a system of symbolic modes, for each individual will create
a reality that is unique to themselves, and dependent on previous experience and its socio-cultural
context.  He therefore moves toward a recognition of representation as “a symbolic relationship that
is relative and variable.”   33
When one seeks to copy or imitate, such representation will always involve bias  –  the eye
will recreate in accordance with its own perception of the world and whatever experiences and
 Ibid., pp. 7-8.34
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needs that have molded that world.  Goodman holds that the eye “selects, rejects, organizes,
discriminates, associates, classifies, analyzes, constructs” , and that if a symbol was merely a34
reflection of some kind of objective reality, there would be no room for the unique rendering of the
world that each individual has.  Consequently, there would be no room for the creative process at
all.  A  symbol, according to Goodman,  not only does not, but can not, mirror:  it creates.  
Such a claim is bound to run into some difficulties, for language, as a symbol system, could
not be continuously recreating an individual’s reality when its sole purpose is communication with
other individuals.  In keeping with this thesis, however, let us consider works of art.  It is necessary
for the artist to utilize symbols that are mirrors of an objective reality, in order to incorporate – or
recreate  –  those symbols into a work of art.  An individual partaking in the experience of a ‘work
of art’ will inevitably interpret the recreation of familiar symbols according to her own experiences,
but that is another matter.  The fact remains that if symbols were creations unique to each
individual, there would be no point of reference with which to communicate. Despite the fact that
objects of art are, generally speaking, a creative interpretation of the world around us, and regardless
of the medium from which they emerge, they are still (for the most part) universally recognized as
works of art.  
Goodman admits that music manifests a much more complicated symbol system, with a far
more complex network of reference (for that is what symbols do, they refer).  According to
Goodman, musical language is unique in that it does not denote any fixed meaning or emotion.  Any
meaning or emotion that is attached to a piece of music belongs solely to the individual
experiencing the music as part of their own ‘world-making’.  Goodman is not concerned at this point
 See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art, pp. 45-95.35
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with musical notation (where a written symbol represents a particular pitch, or a collection of
pitches as in the case of ligature), but with the immediacy of the musical experience and the
emotions and meaning derived from that experience.  Music’s ability to engage the listener (and the
immediacy with which it does so) has to do with music’s possessing that to which it refers, instead
of pointing toward that to which it refers.    While we are engaged in a musical experience, we are35
simultaneously engaged in an emotional experience associated with the music; the musical
experience, therefore, becomes part of our world-making.   
Goodman does not see music as a symbol system mirroring any kind of ‘eternal reality’, he
sees it as a creative tool utilized in reality construction.  As in the example of works of art offered
above, the problem with Goodman’s position with regard to music lies in his claim that symbols can
only create, and that they do not point to, or mirror, any kind of objective reality.  In order to create
a piece of music, the composer must utilize symbols that are mirrors of an objective reality in order
to recreate something unique.  Music is a manifestation of existing numerical ratios, and when
utilized and manipulated according to the composers own intentions (and experiences), the end
result is something that is universally recognized as music, but experienced in a multitude of ways.
This chapter has offered four general positions thus far: the cognitivist (Johann Mattheson);
the emotivist (Harold E. Fiske); the ‘tripartitional’ dialectical (Jean-Jacques Nattiez) and the
nominalist (Nelson Goodman). All four positions attempt to understand how and why emotion and
meaning are forever bound to the musical experience.  The claims offered by each position focus
primarily on the subject experiencing music, hence, the temporal.  Discussions involving meaning
and expression in music necessarily focus primarily upon the listener; each listener will approach
 To exist ‘contingently’ is to be subject to corruption and cessation.36
-70-
a piece of music from within the context of their ‘world’, a world which they have built from within
a social and cultural context, and through experiences, expectations and desires.  All four positions
are woven with strands of truth: the listener experiences emotion x while listening to a musical
composition, the listener strives to extrapolate meaning x from music, the musical experience is a
living dynamic and ever-changing phenomenon that is forever undergoing reinterpretation, and the
music symbols that exist within the musical language have been created by us in order that we may
share the musical experience. The musical experience, however, is not contained within the
temporal framework of the subject.  What is occurring during a musical experience transcends the
temporal, for the subject experiencing a piece of music is partaking in the eternal principles that
serve as music’s most fundamental constituents.  To make the claim (as Goodman does) that there
is no essential and eternal musical fact is ludicrous, for it is the musical fact that the musical
experience is contingent upon.
If one is to assert that all musical experience as we understand it is contingent upon an
independently existing and eternal musical fact, it is important to clarify what is meant by this
claim.  In order to shed some light, it will be said of this musical fact that it is, in an Aristotelian
sense, a kind of ‘cause’.   
Causality is relational: if x provides the conditions to bring about y, then x is thought to be
the cause of y and y is thought to be the effect brought about by x:  y is therefore contingent upon
x.  However we create and recreate music, or whatever attributes we ascribe or interpretations we
extrapolate, such endeavors are subject to change and difference of opinion. Insofar as we
experience music, it exists contingently .  In a temporal sense, the musical experience is ephemeral.36
 To exist ‘necessarily’ is to be incorruptible. 37
 Physics, 194b16-195a4, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1, ed. by Jonathan Barnes.38
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On the other hand, music understood in and of itself – music qua music – is the manifestation of the
immutable principle of D:@<\", its very essence woven with incorruptible mathematical truths that
exist necessarily.   But the following question has yet to be answered: in what way is music qua37
music a cause?  
There are different kinds of causal relationships, but those offered by Aristotle (in his
attempt to provide a general explanation of the ‘why’ of the world) best illustrate the manner in
which music qua music is a cause. The four causes of Aristotle are as follows:
Material Cause: In one way, then, that out of which a thing comes to be and which
persists, is called a cause, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of
the bowl, and the general of which the bronze and the silver are
species.
Efficient Cause: In another way, the form or the archetype, i.e. the definition of the
essence, and its genera, are called causes (e.g. of the octave the
relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.
Formal Cause: Again, the primary source of the change or rest; e.g. the man who
deliberated is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally
what makes of what is made and what changes of what is changed.
Final Cause: Again, in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is
done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about... The same is true also
of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the
action of something else as means towards the end...all these things
are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another.    38
If one is to presuppose that music has inherent eternal principles, and as such music qua music is
a kind of underlying cause of all musical experience, then, which of the four causes best describes
 This includes any musical experience, cross-culturally.39
 Goodman’s argument rests solely in material and final causes.40
  See Nattiez’s classification of the “poietic” Music and Discourse, pp. 15-17.41
 Nattiez claims that “the border between music and noise is always culturally defined –  which implies that, even42
within a single society, this border does not always pass through the same place; in short, there is rarely a consensus”;
Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse, p. 48.  I beg to differ on this point, for there is a general understanding, cross-
culturally, as to what defines an experience as a musical one.  Labeling a series of unorganized, disturbing and unpleasant
dissonances ‘music’ is not making music, it is merely making a solipsistic statement. 
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it?  I propose that it lays claim to two of the four: efficient and formal.   
To illustrate this proposition, let us consider a musical experience.   The material cause is,39
of course, the written or improvised composition, and the final cause is the purpose for which the
musical experience was brought about in the first place, which stems from the intentionality of the
composer and/or performers, and the socio-cultural umbrella under which the experience comes into
being.  The material and final causes are secondary and accidental – they encompass expression,
colour, meaning, and all of the affectations that makes each piece of music distinct .  The efficient40
cause is the creative element that is necessary for any music to come into being , and the formal41
cause is the underlying structure that allows one to recognize it as music .  The efficient and formal42
causes are primary and eternal – they encompass the immutable mathematical truths that comprise
the very fabric of the musical experience, and the harmonia that bounds them together.
There are two potential problems that inevitably surface at this point, and were alluded to
by Goodman in particular.  One problem is that of cultural diversity, especially with regard to
music’s structure and the total musical experience.  A second problem is this:  if music can be
reduced to a complex system of symbols that is a necessary part of our  world-making, then positing
an eternal musical fact (or cause) is pointless.  There is no need for it.  
It cannot be denied that music is structurally diverse, depending on the cultures and the sub-
 The pentatonic scale can be described as a diatonic scale that lacks semi-tones C D E G A C.  For further43
reading on the pentatonic scale in Balinese music, see Benjamin Brinner, “A Musical Time Capsule From Java,” in:
Journal of the American Musicological Society 46/2 (Summer 1993), pp. 221-260 (especially pp. 228-229); Natalie
Kuzmich, “Making Connections: The Sound of Different Traditions – Part 2,” in: Canadian Music Educator 44/2 (Winter
2002), pp. 13-17.
 For further reading on Balinese music, see Neil Sorrell, A Guide to the Gamelan (London: Faber and Faber,44
1990).
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cultures that provide the context for its creation.  The musical experience changes from person to
person, region to region and country to country.  However, when considering the very bare bones
of musical structure, the basic building blocks of music, such as the perfect octave, the perfect fifth,
the perfect fourth, and the pentatonic scale  remain untouched.  How such building blocks are43
utilized, however, will differ from culture to culture.  Two very diverse forms of music that emerged
from two autonomous cultures – Balinese and North American Aboriginal – demonstrate this fact
beautifully.
If one were to compare Balinese music with Western music, one would assume that they
emerged from completely different musical principles.  This is not the case.  Upon closer inspection,
one would discover that the slendro scale in Balinese gamelan music and the pentatonic scale in
Western music are, in fact, structurally the same: both are divided into five equal parts within the
parameters of the octave, the most fundamental consonant interval of all (2:1).  Further, the
Indonesian pelog is constructed in a similar fashion to the diatonic scale, but with wider fourths to
create a shimmering sound that occurs as a result of the rapid beating between upper harmonics.44
 This ‘shimmer’ sounds strange to Western ears because it developed within the context of Balinese
culture; upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that the pelog stems from the same roots as
Western music.  In other words, the basic principles that underlie the two diverse musical
experiences are the same – the manner in which such principles are manipulated will ultimately
 Robert Walker, Music Perception, pp. 54-55.45
 The pentatonic scale is commonly used in Inuit music.  See Elaine Keiller, “Amerindian Music: Canada: Arctic46
Region,” in: The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 29 vols., ed. by Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell,
(London: Macmillan, 2001), Vol. 1, p. 492.
 Throat-singing creates harmonic resonances with the mouth, throat and lips.  This unique method of47
vocalization can create up to six simultaneous pitches by one singer.  The North American Inuit will have two throat
singers manipulating sound with their own mouth and that of their sparring partner.  For a more in depth look at throat-
singing, see Elaine Keiller, “Amerindian Music,”  pp. 492-493; Jean-Jacques Nattiez, “The Rekkukara of the Ainu  and
the Katajjaq of the Inuit: A Comparison,”  in: Le monde de la musique 25/2 (1983), pp. 33-42; Jean-Jacques Nattiez,
“Some Aspects of Inuit Vocal Games,” in: Ethnic Music, 37 (1983), pp. 457-476.
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depend upon the socio-cultural context (that is, the material and final causes).  
Similarly, the North American aboriginal cultures (particularly the Inuit) have a very unique
and distinct musical heritage that is seemingly unlike any other.  Robert Walker writes that
“analysis of North American Indian melody has revealed no common use of ‘perfect’ intervals, no
theory based upon acoustic ratios and no proclivity to use certain intervals above any other.  Quite
random melodic movements appear to form the basis of their melodies.”  Yet he then goes on to say
that “of some importance is the fact that these ‘random’ melodies are easily remembered by singers
and are passed down to later generations intact.”   Musical patterns that are memorable enough to45
be ‘easily remembered’ are not random.  Further, these ‘random’ melodies are recognizable as
melodies by those who have not been raised within the boundaries of these cultures.  The
manipulation of basic core intervals is the same.    The strategic arrangement of dissonance and46
consonance (especially in throat-singing ) is the same.  If it were not the same, music of the North47
American aboriginals (along with all aboriginal peoples around the globe) would be completely and
irreversibly unrecognizable as a ‘musical experience’ to those outside of their cultural sphere.  This,
however, is not the case.
If Goodman’s is correct in his claim that musical symbols are merely a component of our
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‘world-building’ (material and final cause) and that the ‘universal language’ of music, and musical
symbols can be reduced to creative tools that we use to construct reality, then why is it that the most
basic constituents of music are the same in every culture?  How is it that these same fundamental
‘tools’ are used in every known system of music in every known place in our world?  Individuals
from completely diverse cultural contexts can share in a musical experience and recognize it as
such.  The response to the musical experience may differ depending upon the individual, but a
response occurs nonetheless – all are moved in one way or another.  And every individual
understands that they are somehow involved in something musical. 
To be involved in a musical experience is to partake in its essence – an essence that is
immutable, universal and unchanging irrespective of its changing corporeal nature.  It can be argued
that there is something more to music than mere arithmetic, and that this ‘something more’
encompasses the entire ‘lived’ musical experience.   However, this ‘lived’ experience, this on-going
dynamic dialectic, this complex interplay of symbols, exists entirely within our  temporal sphere and
is contingent upon the eternal mathematical laws governing the core constituents of music qua
music.  These eternal constituents of music are what we draw upon to manipulate and create; and
as we experience music we partake, however briefly,  in the eternal principle of harmonia that
manifests itself in the very fundamental constituents of our universe, from the infinite depths of
galaxies to the smallest component of the atom.  Such is music, in and of itself.
 For further explication on this point, see Frieder Zaminer, “Pythagoras und die Anfänge des musiktheoretischen1
Denkens bei den Griechen,” in: Jahrbuch des Staatlichen Instituts für Musikforschung Preußischer Kulturbesitz
1979/1980, pp. 203-211.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: 
Redefining the Interdisciplinary Nature of Philosophy of Music
When considering a “philosophy of music”, the distinction that differentiates musica
theorica and musica practica is an important one.  The purpose of this distinction, however, is not
to place musica theorica and musica practica into a dichotomic context, but to elucidate the
contingent and interrelated relationship that exists between these two approaches; for it has been
made evident throughout this thesis that, despite the turnaround that occurred in musical scholarship
with regard to the pre-eminence of either musica theorica or musica practica from Greek Antiquity
through to present day, there has always existed an underlying tension between the two.  
The Pythagoreans and non-Pythagoreans of Greek Antiquity understood music, first
and foremost, in terms of its mathematical nature. Music scholars and philosophers alike,
recognized the consistency of music’s inherent arithmetic ratios and identified these ratios with the
most fundamental constituents of the cosmos.  We have seen the influence that Pythagoras and his
followers had on musical scholarship for at least two millennia.  Yet, despite the pre-eminence of1
musica theorica, there was still the musician’s ear to contend with, and subsequently those
arguments that placed musica practica ahead of musica theorica.  If we recall, Archytas made
attempts at reconciling pure mathematical theory with the musician’s ear, but there were
discrepancies in his tuning systems, and in the end he kept true to  Pythagorean doctrine and never
 See Chapter 2 above in this thesis.2
 See Chapter 2 above in this thesis.3
 Note that, although musical scholars such as Franchino Gaffurio devoted separate volumes to musica theorica4
(Theorica musice (1492)) and musica practica (Practica musicae (1496)), musica theorica was still thought to have pre-
eminence over musica practica; see Franchino Gaffurio, The Theory of Music, trans. by Walter Kreyszig.
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questioned the infallibility of the inherent arithmetical ratios.  Aristoxenus, on the other hand,2
disregarded the purely mathematical approach, and argued that a science of harmonics must begin
with the practicing musician who hears whether or not an interval is consonant or dissonant without
knowing anything of its inherent numerical ratio.   One can see, therefore, that as early as the fourth3
century B.C.E., at a time when the discipline of music was understood as a rigorous science, there
existed a tension between the purely mathematical approach and the strictly empirical approach to
the science of harmonics. This undercurrent of tension continued unabated throughout the Middle
Ages and intensified even further in the Renaissance.4
From the sixth century C.E. until the Renaissance, musica theorica remained in the
foreground with Boethius’ seminal treatise, the De institutione musica.  Considered the primary
authoritative source for music scholars until the sixteenth century, it could very well have been
intended specifically for the quadrivium as a pedagogical tool alongside his De institutione
arithmetica. The objective of the De institutione musica is to incite its reader into a contemplative
approach to music; musica theorica is placed ahead of musica practica, and an entire book is
devoted to the existing tension between musica theorica and musica practica.   Eventually, toward
the end of the sixteenth century, music’s place as one of the four scientific disciplines of the
quadrivium underwent much scrutiny and the tension between musica theorica and musica practica
 Claude V. Palisca, “Scientific Empiricism,” p.  92.5
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reached a breaking point.   Instead of resolving this tension, the trend in musical scholarship sought5
to eradicate it entirely, merging the two disciplines with a decided emphasis on musica practica.
 From this pivotal point in the history of musical scholarship to present day,  philosophy of
music has kept itself within the discipline of musica practica, devoting itself to the subject partaking
in the musical experience.  It is taken for granted, therefore, that philosophical discussions about
music must be subjective in nature.  Musica theorica, the discipline that seeks objective truths about
music, has been thoughtlessly neglected and consequently “music theory” has been redefined as a
subsidiary component to musical performance – understood as a given set of rules and nothing more.
The extraordinary significance of the fundamental mathematical principles underlying these rules
is no longer dwelled upon, and therefore the most astounding property of music is overlooked.
If we are to redefine the interdisciplinary nature of philosophy of music, we must redefine
music itself. We must revisit those scholars who understood the ontological significance of music’s
inherent mathematical principles.  Not only did they recognize the need for an understanding of
music that  encompasses both musica theorica and musica practica, but they also apprehended
music’s eternal nature, and, therefore, the necessary contingency of musica practica (the temporal
and ephemeral component of music that we understand as the “musical experience”) upon musica
theorica (the eternal component that expresses itself through unchanging numerical ratios).  It is a
wonder that the pre-eminence of musica theorica over musica practica has been forgotten in
philosophy of music, for throughout Greek Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and well into the
Renaissance, music was understood as being rooted in the intellect, with its harmonious branches
spreading from those roots and into the musical experience.  Guido of Arezzo poignantly illustrated
 Guido of Arezzo, Regulae rhythmicae as found in Musicae Guidonis regulae rhythmicae, ed. by Martin6
Gerbert, pp.25-34. Vol. 2 of Scriptores ecclesiastici de musica sacra potissimum ex variis Italiae, Galliae et Germaniae
codicibus manuscriptis collecti et nunc primum publica luce donati. 1784, rpt. (Milan: Bollettino Bibliografico Musicale,
1931is reprint of 1784); Guidonis Aretini tres tractutuli editi cum apparatu critico: Regulae dictae Rhymicae, Vol. 4
of Divitiae Musicae Artis (Series A). (Buren: Frits Knuf, 1985).  For the English translation, see Franchino Gaffurio, The
Theory of Music, trans. by Walter Kreyszig, p. 43.  This quote is Guido of Arezzo’s acrimonious articulation of the
distinction between the cantor and musicus that was made by Isadore of Seville (559-636), a prominent encyclopedist
of the Middle Ages.  For further reading on this distinction, see Erich Reimer, “Musicus – Cantor,” in: Handwörterbuch
der musikalischen Terminologie, ed. by Hans-Heinrich Eggebrecht (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1978), pp. 1-13; Erich
Reimer, “Musicus und Cantor: Zur Sozialgeschichte eines musikalischen Lehrstücks,” in: Archiv für Musikwissenschaft
35 (1978), pp. 1-32.
-79-
this concept when he sardonically pronounced that “great is the difference between musicians and
singers: the latter [merely] sing, the former know what music is made of.  One who does what he
does not know is defined to be an animal.”  6
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